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Article 5

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

NOTES
CONDITIONAL SELLERS AND REAL MORTGAGES.-Inquiry into this prob-

lem is greatly handicapped because many courts fail to distinguish
properly between conditional sales and chattel mortgage arrangements.
In conditional selling, title to the chattel sold remains with the vendor
until the final installment is made, at which time title passes to the
vendee. This should be distinguished from the typical sale subject to
chattel mortgage, where, in jurisdictions in which the equitable view of
mortgage obtains, ownership is vested in the vendee, subject to sale
under execution against him.
In seeking to determine the respective rights of conditional sellers
and real mortgagees in foreclosure, the status of the goods in question
(whether real or personal property) is the crux of the proceeding; if
deemed to be a fixture, it goes to the real mortgagee; if held to be personality, it may be repossessed by the conditional seller.
In ascertaining the status of any given item, its physical nature,
mode of annexation, and the intent of the litigant parties as well as of
the bankrupt must be taken into account. The intent element is not so
important in this type of case, as it is usually conflicting, i.e., the bankrupt party's intention when he signed the conditional sales contract
might have been entirely different than when he mortgaged his property.
This being true, we must rely more heavily upon the earlier tests in
this respect.
Wherever the status of goods is in question, the courts are disposed
to rule adversely to the conditional seller, as if to penalize him for laches
in not recording the conditional sales contract. Thus, in a recent case
emanating from the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 the Court said in
part: In making sales upon the partial payment plan, it is just as easy
to take a mortgage and have it recorded, and little additional expense is
incurred thereby." Here the Court suggests that conditional selling
shofuld be abandoned in favor of chattel mortgage selling. The gist of
this decision was that although certain stoves could be removed without
injury to the freehold, the conditional seller's reservation of title was
invalid as against a subsequent purchaser of the realty without notice.
Although this was not a foreclosure, the principle involved is the same.
In reviewing pertinent cases,2 the general rule appears to be that
conditional sellers have a superior right as against subsequent -purchasers
and mortgagees only where the goods in question can be removed from
the freehold without material injury to the latter thereby, and not always
even then in the light of present statutes, as will be indicated presently.
1
2

Knoxville Gas Co. v. W. I. Kirby & Sons, 161 Tenn. 490, 32 S.W. (2) 1054 (19:30).
Lidell Co. v. T. C. Cork et al.. - S. C. -, 113 S. E. 327 (1922).
Babcock-Davis Corp. v. Paine, 240 Mass. 438, 134 N. E. 342 (1922).
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Arnold, 282 Fed. 43 (1922).
Kohler Co. v. Brasum, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. S1, (1928).
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The Indiana legislature has in substance adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Law.3 Specific provision is made for recording conditional
sales contracts, and it is further provided that the reservation of title
to goods affixed to realty, conditionally sold, is void as against subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees without notice even though such goods might
be removed without injury to the freehold, unless the contract is properly recorded as provided by law. It follows that where the conditional
seller of goods subsequently affixed to a freehold fails to record his contract, he has virtually no rights whatsoever as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. The importance to the conditional seller of properly recording his contract is, then, readily apparent. Unfortunately,
owing to the recent enactment of this law, few if any cases have yet
arisen in Indiana which are clearly in point.
Taking as a hypothetical case a situation in which a furnace is
installed by a conditional seller, and further assuming the bankruptcy
of the buyer and foreclosure by a subsequent real mortgagee, it is
inescapable that the conditional seller's reservation of title under an
unrecorded contract would be invalid as against, a subsequent mortgagee,
and that he in no way could replevy the furnace, even though its removal
would occasion little or no injury to the freehold. If, however, the conditional seller would have filed at the county courthouse a copy of his
conditional sales agreement, in accordance with the statute, he probably
would be permitted to repossess the furnace, provided its removal would
not involve material injury to the freehold. Of course, as a matter of
practical application, if the conditional seller were to physically retake
his property before the real mortgagee could effectively enjoin him from
so doing, it is doubtful whether the latter could recover from the former
in a court action, irrespective of whether the agreement was recorded or
not.
David S. Landis
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERED PERIL.-At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the rule that a plaintiff in an action based on negligence
is barred from recovery by his own negligence first found clear expression.1 Early decisions (1798-1810) accepted this rule only where the
plaintiff's negligence was later in point of time than the defendant's.2
After 1810 the decisions in the courts of the King's Bench and Common
Pleas paid no attention to the timing of the parties respective acts of
negligence.
A new element then sifted into the decisions: the doctrine "of last
clear chance." This rule--'tho not the phrase, is usually traced to the
celebrated case of Davies v. Mann.3 The decision holds that the negligence of the plaintiff in leaving his donkey on the highway so fettered
3
1
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Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated, Title 58, Sect. 806.
8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 459.
Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 865 (K. B. 1798), Clay -. Wood, 5 Esp. 44, (K. B.

1803), Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, (K. B. 1809) ; Flower v. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314.
3 Davies v. Mann, 10 M & W 546, (Ex. 1842).
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as to prevent it from getting out of the way of the carriage of the defendant who negligently drove against it did not preclude recovery.... Parke,
B. stated:
"Although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the
defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as would
be likely to avoid mischief or danger to another."
A reading of the case shows that the court in no way intended to lay
down the broad concept which has been accredited to it.
This doctrine of "last clear chance" abrogated the accepted rule of
contributory negligence. The courts failed to realize that the rule is a
limitation which inheres in the defense of contributory negligence itself
-rather than one which avoids the effect of contributory negligence.
The theory developed a new phase of proximate causation. Under it
plaintiff can recover because his negligence is but a condition or remote
cause of his injury while the defendant's negligence is the sole proximate
cause.... Many courts have labeled this doctrine: "The last wrongdoer
doctrine." The phrase is an apt one. New York, Oregon, Ohio and New
Hampshire refer to it as the "Doctrine of Discovered Peril." Two landmark cases 4 announce the rule in my home jurisdiction of New York.
In the Woloszynowoski case, a young boy went upon the tracks
of the defendant New York Central railroad, and stood there in the
path of an approaching train. The boy was obviously negligent for he
came on the tracks after the crossing-gate was lowered. From the evidence, he was seen first by the brakeman and fireman aboard the locomotive. They shouted a warning to the engineer who applied the brakes
at once-but not soon enough: the boy was struck and killed. His parents
maintained an action on the theory that in such an emergency the brakeman and fireman should have themselves jumped to the brake and
stopped the train without losing the precious second to warn the engineer. Justice Cardozo dismissed the complaint stating that the incident
would not waken into a cause of action: "unless there is brought home to
the defendant to be charged with the liability, a knowledge that another
is in a state of present peril, in which event there must be reasonable
effort to counteract the peril and avert its consequences." He suggested
that such knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence.
In the Scrogi case the plaintiff's truck stalled upon a railroad crossing maintained by the defendant. While Scrogi attempted to abandon
his truck an oncoming train hit and killed him instantly. The court in
an often cited opinion stated:
"The doctrine of "discovered peril"-sometimes known as: "subsequent negligence," permits a recovery by a plaintiff who, by his own
lack of care, may have placed himself or his property in position of
danger, provided there is proof of the knowledge of the plaintiff's peril
by the defendant in time to avoid the injury occasioned, and a failure
4 Woloszynowoshi v.
N. E. 471.

New York Centr l R.

R. Co.,, 254 N.

Y. 206,

(1930).
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5 Sprogi v. New York Central R. R. Co., 247 App. Div. 95, 286 N. Y. Supp. 215.
(1936).
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oy the defendant to use reasonable care to avoid such happening. It is
not sufficient to establish that the defendant ought to have discovered,
or, should have discovered the perilous situation by ordinary care."
The last two sentences distinguish the New York rule from numerous jurisdictions which construe a fictitious notice to the defendant if
a reasonable man would have seen the peril of the plaintiff under similar
circumstances. The Restatement of Torts also applies the rule of
constructive notice. Section 479 states:
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to risk of
harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover
for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm:
(a) plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable care
and vigilance, and,
(b) defendant:
(i) realizes the helpless peril.
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and has reason to realize the-peril involved.
(iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation had he
exercised vigilance.
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and diligence his then existing ability to avoid harming
the plaintiff.
Please note section "b-ill." New York State refuses to accept this
portion of the Restatement. It must be conclusively proven that the
defendant actually knew the situation the plaintiff was in, and, further,
realized the situation to be perilous. If the defendant can prove what
amounts to be anything less than willful injury under the circumstances,
the plaintiff can not recover. The rule is not'generally accepted in other
jurisdictions. In spite of adverse criticism, New York holds tenaciously
to the doctrine. The fact that Cardozo accepted it may be a strong
influence. Only one case departs from it and develops a different theory.
In W7ight v. Union Ry. Co.,7 the plaintiff intestate was killed by a
street car operated by the defendant. The defendant was sitting at a
place in the roadway where there was no cross-walk or any apparent
reason for his presence. The court dismissed the complaint stating:
"The negligence of a person who places himself in a position of
peril and the negligence of one failing to see him may be described
as "concurrent negligence." The doctrine of discovered peril makes
one liable only for the willful negligence he performs, or because
of failure or unwillingness to endeavor to avoid an accident where
it might .be avoided."
This new doctrine of "concurrent negligence" is seldom cited in the New
York decisions.
Our general rule is nicely summed up in a recent law review:8
"Under ordinary circumstances the plaintiff would be barred from
recovery by his own negligence. Under this doctrine he may
recover if certain facts are present. It must appear that the
defendant knows the peril of the plaintiff. It must appear that the
6 Restatement of Torts: S 479.
7 229 X. Y. S. 162. 224 App. Div. 55.
8 Edward C. Jones: 15 S. Cal. L. R. 83.
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plaintiff can not escape from this peril. Finally, it must be shown
that the defendant had opportunity to avoid the accident had he
acted with ordinary care, but he failed to so conduct himself and
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE RULE

One who negligently leaves a domestic animal on a highway may
recover from one who, seeing it, does not use proper care to avoid
running over it.9
If a vessel fails to exhibit proper lights and takes the improper
side of the channel, there is no defense in favor of one, who having
warning, fails to use proper care to avoid doing an injury.1O
If a locomotive engineer sees persons or property on the tracks, 'tho
unlawfully there, he must use ordinary care to avoid a collision.11
Where a pedestrian steps from behind an elevated pillar directly
into the path of a south-bound truck, when the traffic lights are in
favor of the north-south-bound traffic, and is thrown into the path of
and run-over by a north-bound truck, the latter's owner cannot be liable
under the doctrine.12
Where a boy jumps in front of a truck, and is thrown so that only
his arm is caught under the truck, and the driver-aware of the situation, starts the truck and drives it over the boy's body killing him, the
jury may find the truck-owner liable.13
The only other phase of the doctrine not previously mentioned here
was well stated in Paranese v. Union R. R.14
"A plaintiff who sees the plaintiff in a perilous state may assume
he will be careful and escape until something unusual about the
situation indicates the contrary."
Hence, we have seen the doctrine of "Discovered Peril" in New York
State. I have attempted to show it is a minority rule differing and distinct from the Restatement, clear in the cases-but criticized.
William B. Lawless
OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES.-Oil and natural gas from beneath the
surface of the earth are usually regarded as minerals. In the case of
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co.,1 the court identified oil, as follows: "Petroleum oil
is a mineral and while it is in the earth it forms a part of realty, and
when it reaches a well, and is produced on the surface, it becomes
personal property, and belongs to the owner of the well." Because of
their migratory and pugnacious nature, gas and oil are not property in
the sense that materials in place are property, but, owing to their fluid
character, they are subject to rules different from those applicable to
other minerals, and are treated somewhat after the analogy of underground water. The Indiana court has held2 that they are a part of land
9 See fn. 3.
10 Austin v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 43 N. Y. 75.
11 Bragg v. Central By. Co., 228 N. Y. 54, 126 N. E. 253. (1920).
12 Dino v. Eastern Glass Co.. 213 App. Div. 75, 246 N. Y. S. 306.
13 Maranto v .Welzelberg, 241 App. Div., 420, 272 N. Y. S. 710.
14 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933).
1

57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.

E. 399,

(1897).
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until they are removed therefrom, consequently oil and gas in place pass
by a conveyance of the interest and estate of the holder of the fee. But
the owner of the land can claim the gas or oil thereunder only so long as
it remains there, and, if it escapes into other land, even as a result of
the act of the owner of the latter, the owner of the land under which it
had previously accumulated can no longer assert any right thereto. In
accordance with this principle, one may, by the use of pumps in his own
well, create a vacuum and thereby bring into his possession oil and gas
underlying his neighbor's land. The above noted principle is a general
one, but usually applies where oil and gas are found in pools. In the
case where oil and gas percolates through the rock and the oil is removed
rather by a suction method than a pumping method it has been held,
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., supra,that if oil boundaries are established (these
boundaries usually provide that a well shall not be drilled within two or
three hundred feet of a neighbor's property) then the owner of the oil
under his land is estopped from placing his wells so close to the boundary that his well will suck oil from his neighbor's land.
Oil and gas in the land are occasionally referred to as belonging to
the owner of the land, but in view of their liability to escape into other
land, they can be regarded as belonging to the owner of the land in a
very limited sense, if at all.3 Each surface owner in an oil or gas area
has the exclusive right on his own land to seek for gas and oil in the
reservoir beneath, but has no fixed or certain ownership of them until
he reduces them to actual possession.4 In view of the restricted nature
of the ownership of which oil or gas in the land is thus capable, it would
seem that like water in the land, it is not properly a subject of ownership distinct from the soil itself, but there is not lacking authority that
it is susceptible of such ownership.5
When, gas or oil is severed from the land it is in the nature of a
profit a prendre. A profit is defined as: "A right to partake of some
product or constituent of another's land without enjoying possession of
the land."6 It is necessarily, unless in exceedingly rare instances, accompanied by incidental easements, usually of way, which either make
possible or facilitate the profit's enjoyment. One may acquire a profit
to take the oil, but has no rights to the oil until it is severed from the
land. Thus if one's neighbor takes away the oil from the land on which
one has a profit, the one having the profit has no recourse. His rights
accrue only after the severance of the oil from the land.
In Indiana, the right of the owner of land to extract the gas therein
has been regarded as subject to a limitation that the gas must not be
wasted or needlessly extracted in such a way as to threaten the destruction of the supply. This view is in accord with the rule that the owner
of land is not the owner of the gas and oil therein until he has reduced
it to actual possession.
2
3
4
5
6

13 Ind. App. 680, 42 N. E. 234, (1895).
28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1901).
Volume 2 Tiffany on Real Property.
166 Ind. 402. 77 N. E. 739, (1905).
National Lai Library, Vol. V, Real Property pp. 292-293.
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A lease is the act by which there is created a lease-hold interest in
land. An oil or gas lease may either have the legal effect of a grant for
a limited period of the right to take oil or gas from the land, or as a
sale of the oil when it may come from the seller's possession. In such
case the lessee's rights are limited to exploring and producing, and he
does not acquire title to the oil or gas until it has been taken from the
ground. The lease may also operate, apparently, as a conveyance of an
interest of that part of the land beneath the surface in which the oil or
gas exists, free from liability for waste by reason of the extraction of
the oil or gas.
An oil or gas lease which contemplates,7 in the first place, merely an
exploration of the land in order to ascertain whether oil or gas can be
found therein "in paying quantities" has been regarded as vesting no
proprietory right in the lessee until oil or gas to that extent is actually
folund and as expressed in some of the cases, as giving him a mere
option in connection with the land, so that, in case he fails to exercise a
reasonable diligence in the search for oil or gas, or in case he fails to
find it by the exercise of such diligence, his interest under the lease,
such as it was, comes to an end. An Indiana case states as follows:
"Where a lease is for a definite term" and "so long thereafter as oil is
found in paying quantities," the lease expires by its own term at the
,end of such a term.
In the leading case of Arrington v. United Royalty Company,8 the
court held: "A royalty under an oil and gas lease, when'severed from
the reversion, is personal property if the lease is for a term of years
expiring at a certain time; but is real property if the lease may endure
for an indeterminate period." McMillan's Dictionary describes a royalty
as: "Compensation received by a landowner from the lessee of mineral
or other rights." It is necessary to explore more fully the court's interpretation of "royalty." Apparently the word "royalty" has been used to
fefer to title to oil in the ground, to oil in the ground considered as
potential personalty, or title thereto, to oil after severance from the
realty, to title to a portion of severed oil, and to the right to share in
such oil as is or may be produced under an oil contract.9 The courts
appear not only to have, properly enough, given consideration to what
laymen, in general, mean, or what particular litigants and contracting
parties have meant, by "royalty," but to have gone further, and in their
statement of decisions frequently have adopted such terlinology.
In the case of Campbell v. Lynchlo the court held that where, subsequent to the delivery of a lease upon oil lands, but prior to the production of oil therefrom, the land is partitioned without mention of oil
royalties provided for in the lease, the royalty is to be divided among
the several owners without reference to the places on the land subject
to the lease from which it is actually taken. Part of the theory of that
decision is that royalty is not, properly speaking, oil in the ground or
7 63 Ind. App. 201, 112 N. E. 36, (1916).
8 188 Ark. 270. 65 S. W. (2) 36, (1933).

9 90 A. L. R. 774.
10 81 W. Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739, (1917).
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title thereto, nor the land or title thereto, but is a separate and distinct
entity-the fruit of a burden upon the title.11 The court declared that
"an owner of a tract of land subject to such a burden may sell and convey the land and retain the royalty, or sell the royalty and keep the
land;" that "if he conveys the whdle tract and does not reserve, or stipulate for, the royalty, it passes with the land to his grantee, but, if he
sells only a part of the land, the situation is altogether different." The
court further said: "Of course, the oil and gas adhere to the land and
are parts of it, until severed. Until severance takes place, the lessee has
no title. On severance, and not earlier, the royalty is payable. Then the
oil or gas, as the case may be, is personal property, for alienation or
disposition of which no deed or other solemn instrument of conveyance
is necessary. It is personal property in the hands of the lessee, and he
has bound himself to deliver a portion of it, called royalty, to the lessor
as rent in kind, for occupation, use, and operation of the lessor's mine.
In the case of Wettengel v. Gormley12 it was declared that an oil
lease for a denite term of years only was personalty, and that the right
to unaccrued royalty thereon was a chosen action which, under the
statute of Pennsylvania, passed on the death of the owner to his personal
representatives, and not to his heirs. In Kentuckyl3 there is a contra
holding: "Unaccrued royalties should be incidents to the reversion and
pass with it, since it is settled that, without a reservation of the rents,
an alienation of the reversion by the act of the landlord or by force of
law vests in the alienee the subsequently accruing rents."
After reviewing cases and considering the subject problem to quote:
"Whether, after the lessor has died, and has a producing oil well, do the
royalties go to the deceased estate or to the-heirs?" Since oil is considered part of the realty until actually brought to the surface it is reasonable to presume that the oil in the ground will pass to the heirs along
with the property. Any oil which has been produced and severed from
the earth, such as oil in storage for which payment has not been made,
will be considered as personal property and will pass to the estate along
with any monies due for royalties on the oil already produced. Any oil
pumped out of the earth after the death of the lessor will go to the heirs.
A Pennsylvania case holds:14 "Oil produced from wells on lands leased
for oil purposes during the owner's life is income." After the death of
the lessor the oil royalties would be considered as income from the land
and to this income the heirs are entitled.
Further,15 courts have held, in the absence of agreement between the
parties, that oil royalties shall be divided among the parties according to
their primary interest in the land; to the life tenant the income for life
on the whole of the royalties, and to the remainderman the preserved
corpus of the royalties after the death of the life tenant.
Robert Oberfell
11
12
13
14
15

90 A. T R1.
774.
184 Pa. 354, 39 A. 57, (1898).
227 Ky. 607, 13 S. IV. (2) .772, (1929).
138 Pa. 606, 21 A 16, (1891).
193 Ky. 192, 235 S. W. 757, (1921).
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ORGANIZED BASEBALL AND THE LAw.--"Until very recently there has
been more or less controversy as to the early history and origin of baseball, some contending that it is only a modified form of the English game
of 'rounders'. In order to settle the dispute a special baseball commission
was appointed, consisting of a number of eminent men. Their report was
published in 1907, and the commission, after full investigation, unanimously decided that baseball is distinctively an American game; that
it originated in Cooperstown, New York, in 1839, and that the first
scheme for playing it was the invention of General Abner Doubleday,
who afterward graduated from West Point and achieved honorable distinction in the Civil War. The rules of the game as first published by
the Knickerbocker Club of New York in 1845 differ only in a few minor
details from those of the modern game. Baseball was first played by
regular clubs in 1845, and while it had begun to attract attention in the
'fifties' it did not become a commoon form of sport or exercise and was
not generally played until 1865.1" Later, when regular leagues were
introduced to the public, the game grew in popularity. With this growth,
problems of law arose with it. We shall attempt to cover our subject
matter generally, as an aid to everyday problems of the club owners,
managers and players.
The assault of a player upon a spectator in the stands for "razzing"
the player has caused many a headache for the club owners. Undoubtedly
the spectator was at fault for "riding" the player to such an extent that
the player had to vent his wrath on his persecutor. The Supreme Court
of Georgia defined the owner's liability for such an act by stating,
"Where a baseball player employed by the proprietor of a baseball park
left his position of pitcher upon the grounds and entered the grandstand,
and there assaulted a spectator because the latter had "razzed" him
or criticized his playing, the assault was not committed within the scope
of his employment nor in the prosecutiopn of his master's business, but
was his personal act in resenting a real or fancied insult.2"
The baseball fan is an institution in the United States. The spectator
applauds, "hoots and hollers," and occasionally runs rampant over a close
decision on the part of the umpire. But this fan has a habit of not ducking foul balls and doing other acts that no one would believe possible.
The law protects this person but also keeps an eye on the club owner,
who may have to foot the bills when a patron is injured by one way or
another.
Perhaps the most common form of accident is to have a spectator hit
by a foul ball. Courts have discussed this type of injury in many states.
The Pacific Coast League had an unforunate accident and in 1929 the
Oregon Supreme Court said, "Baseball club held not liable where foul
ball took sharp inshoot around end of screen and struck patron in
reserved seat, where baseball club had construdted 150 feet of screen and
maintained it in good condition, since accident was one which could not
reasonably have been anticipated.3" This was certainly a freak accident,
1
2
3

State v. Prather, 100 P. 57, 79 Kan. 513, 21 LR.A., N. S., 23.
Atlanta Baseball Co. v. Lawrence, 144 S.E. 351, (1928).
Curtiss v. Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277 (1929).
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when a person desired to be protected from such an occurrence to have
the ball inshoot around the edge of the screen and strike her.
The St. Louis Cardinals were brought into court by a lady who
slipped on a step in the park. It seems as though it rained and the game
was called about the third inning. This lady while making an exit down
a stairway stepped down and her foot slipped. She fell and rather
severely injured herself. She claimed there should have been a handrail
present that she could hang on to. The Cardinals attorney showed the
inadvisability of a hand rail and pointed out that such would be highly
impracticable. Furthermore, it was 'shown that water could not collect
on the steps because each step had a slight slope towards the field to
avoid circumstances such as this. The court said, "A baseball club is
liable to persons attending games only for injuries occasioned by unsafe
conditions of premises arising from negligence and known to club alone.4"
Thus the club was not held liable.
The Louisiana Supreme Court said, "Spectator at a baseball game,
by selecting seat in 'bleachers' assumed risk for injuries inflicted by
batted ball during practice immediately preceding game.5" The court
went on to say, "It is knowledge common to all that in these games hard
balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness; that they are liable
to be muffed or batted or thrown outside of the lines of the diamond,
and visitors standing in position that may be reached by such balls have
voluntarily placed themselves there with knowledge of the situation, and
may be held to assume the risk.6" Moreover, it said, "In view of the
facts that the general public is invited to attend these games, that hard
balls are thrown and batted with great force and swiftness and that
such balls often go in the direction of the spectators, we think the duties
of the defendants toward their patrons included that of providing seats
protected by screening from wildly thrown or fouled balls, for the use
of patrons who desired such protection.7" The Minnesota court went
along with this reasoning by stating "spectator at baseball game, who
occupies emergency seat behind third base outside foul line, assumes risk
of injury from foul balls.8"
At Sportsman's Park, St. Louis, the Browns and White Sox were
playing in September of 1931. The park was being prepared for the
World Series, which was several weeks away. Temporary boxes were half
erected in front of the permanent box seats. A young lady sitting in one
of the boxes with her escort was injured when a foul ball sped in their
direction. Ordinarily the ball would have missed the woman by ten or
fifteen feet, but it struck part of the unfinished box seats and flew very
unexpectedly at her, causing considerable damage. The court pointed
out that "It is common knowledge that a large part of those who attend
baseball games prefer to sit where there is no screen to obscure their
view. In patron's action against ball club for injury sustained when
struck by batted ball whether club created unusual hazard constituting
4 Lappin v. St. Louis Nat. League Baseball Club, 33 S.W. (2nd) 1025. (1931).
5 Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Go. 133 So. 408 (1931).
6 Blakely v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482, 19 L.R.A., N.S., 772.

7 Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. 301, 153 S.W. 1076.
8 Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass n., 240 N.W. 903 (1932).
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actionable negligence by permitting temporary stands to be maintained
in front of regular stands in close proximity to playing field held for
jury.9"
Gus Suhr fouled off a ball in an exhibition game between San Francisco and Pittsburgh which struck a fourteen year old girl. The girl was
athletic and had seen many games. However, she desired to sit in a
screened portion of the stand and an usher had seated her in an
unscreened portion because the protected seats were already filled. Here
the California Supreme Court pointed out, "Ordinary care to protect
patrons of baseball parks from being struck by batted or thrown balls
does not require park management to screen all seats or provide screened
seats for all who may apply for them, but only to provide screened seats
for as many patrons as may reasonably be expected to call for them on
ordinary occasions. An athletic girl of fourteen, who took an unscreened
seat along first base line with full knowledge of danger attached to so
doing assumed risk of injury from thrown or batted balls and could not
recover for injury resulting from batted ball, although she desired a
screened seat in such section in which none was availaable and took
unscreened seat temporarily at suggestion of usher."1o
In the case of Blackhall v. Albany Baseball and Amusement Company, the court said, "Baseball, part owners, providing screened and
unscreened seat are not absolute insurers of safety of patrons entering
park during batting practice until they reach their chosen seats unprotected by screens; such practice not being wrongful if not negligently
indulged in. One attempting to procure seat in unscreened portion of
baseball park bleachers during batting practice assumed incidental risk
of being struck by foul ball while moving in aisle toward such seat and
hence cannot recover damages from park owner for resulting injury."1
The injured patron decided to sit in the open to receive the heat from
the sun as it was the first game of the year.
The Supreme Court of Washington found the club liable for injuries
sustained by a patron struck by a foul ball. The spectator attended a
game in Seattle where a new park had just been constructed. The owners
had only put up a screen thrity feet each way from the center of the
stand behind home plate. The court concluded that if they had gone further to sixty feet as planned, that it would have provided a reasonable
screened portion. The spectator was between thirty and sixty feet of
the unscreened portion. But the court further stated, "In an action by
a patron at a baseball game, who was struck by a foul ball the question
whether he was negligent in sitting where he did, there being safe seats
available, held for the jury."12
While leaving the Polo Grounds in New York on a damp and rainy
day, a spectator was going up a ramp provided by the baseball club to
the elevated railway after a game. He slipped and fractured his leg.
4
The incline was Y2 percent greater than ordinarily used and there
was a dispute as to whether the markings or corrugations were sufficient
9
10
11
12

Grimes v. American League Baseball Club, 78 S.W. (2nd) 520 (1935).
Quinn v. Recreation Park, 46 P. (2nd) 144, California (1935).
255 N.Y.S. 695 (1936).
Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 177 P. 776 (1919).
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to prevent slipping. The court turned the case back to the jury, but the
ramp had been constructed ten years previous; thus we are inclined to
believe the plaintiff may have recovered in his action.13
"In patron's action against baseball club to recover for injuries
sustained when a baseball bat flew out of the hands of a player and
struck patron who was eight feet distant in grandstand and on way to
seat in protected area, the question whether the accident could have
reasonably been anticipated was for jury. Moreover, those who are in
charge of professional baseball games are under duty reasonably to
protect that part of the grandstand behind and near the home plate
where the greatest danger from flying balls exists."14 Plaintiff recovered
in this case.
The same result was had in another case 15 where the judge said:
"In action by patron who paid for screened seat and was struck in the
face by a baseball fouled into grandstand in first half of the ninth inning
as patron was leaving the grandstand by one of several exits, whether
the proprietor was negligent in its duty to exercise ordinary care for
safety of patron in failing to extend screen protection to cover exits
used by patrons in leaving stand was for jury in view of known fact
that patrons come and go during progress of game."
An Ohio case presented a rather unusual situation when a spectator
was struck by a ball during a "pepper game" hId by the players between
games of a "double-header." The patron was sitting in a box seat in an
unscreened section of the grandstand when she was injured by a foul
ball in the "pepper game." The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by
stating, "When several balls are simultaneously in play upon the field,
it is impossible for the spectator to protect himself by watching the
ball, for more than one ball is being ihrown or batted at once. During
the course of the game itself the spectator can watch the ball. During
the course of the practice he cannot follow the maneuvers of all of the
possible groups. The playing during the game is confined for the most
part to the diamond, and to those portions of the field way from the
grandstand, the batter always intends to bat away from the home plate.
It is true that foul balls frequently fly in the direction of the spectators,
but the playing is directed away from the spectators for the most part
rather than toward them. And the throwing which is done toward the
spectators from the pitcher's box, from bases, or from the outfield is
from a distance considerabley removed from the grand stand so that
the danger of injury from balls thrown and batted during the game is
not so great as the danger from balls thrown or batted in a practice
going on at all times within the sidelines nearest the grandstand." 16
At Forbes Field, Pittsburgh, an unusual incident occurred about a
decade ago. A spectator, sixty-five years old, was attending a game, when
he was struck on the knee by a collapsible iron gate. The gate is the
type ordinarily used in stadiums to partition the grand stand seats from
13 Glynne v. National Exhibition Co.. 198 N.Y.S. 751 (1923).
14 Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club of the Pacific Coast League 81 P.
625 (1938).
15 Olds v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, 119 S.W. (2nd) 1000 (1938).
16 Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno. 147 N. E. 86 (1925).
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the general admission seats in the aisle behind said seats, thus when
the game is over, said, gate may be collapsed to let the crowd out more
rapidly. The gate was located to the rear of the patron. It had no channel
in the floor to guide it nor a weel of any sort. The terminus of the gates
was a post several feet behind the man. An usher was supposed to watch
the gate, but a vendor going through the gate carelessly closed the gate
after him, but the gate did not stop at its terminus but continued on and
struck plaintiff's knee a glancing blow which resulted in a permanent
injury. There was a slope in the stands towards the field thus providing
the impetus to take the gate further than intended.
The Jacob Brothers had the concession at Forbes Field and it was
their employee who had negligently set the gate in motion. The plaintiff
recovered against the ball club. The club had a contract with concessionaires stating that they would be liable for injuries caused by their
employees. Here the club provided the gate which caused the injury
and the vendor set it in motion to accomplish the injury. The club was
charged with negligence in permitting such a gate to exist, while negligence of the vendor of Jacob's in closing the gate made both responsible.17
In the Piedmont League a fan was injured at a home game of the
Durham Club. Being a farm club of the "Reds" they were made defendants. The North Carolina court stated, "The city which owned the baseball field, and owner of baseball clube were not liable to patron who was
struck by foul ball while sitting in bleacher section, because bleacher
seats were unprotected from batted balls, where protected seats were
furnished elsewhere."18 The bleachers were erected behind third base,
and there were screened seats available if spectator so desired. Plaintiff
failed to recover.
A child, four years old, was injured while attending a game with his
father. The ball park had its "S.R.O." sign out and about 5,000
people took advantage of it. A group of young fellows were standing on
a beam watching the game. In "fooling around," one of them fell, injuring the child. Was the club owner negligent in permitting these young
fellows to stand in their position? The court said he was not, and pointed
out that the unusual conduct of these young men caused the accident
in this case.19
"An operator of a baseball park, sued by a woman for injuries sustained when struck by a foul ball while sitting in unscreened section of
grandstand, was not negligent in failing to warn woman of dangers
incident to occupancy of unscreened seats, where woman was a mature
woman presumably possessed of average intelligence, with nothing about
her manner or appearance to set her apart from other patrons or to
indicate her claimed inexperience, or lack of appreciation of perils of
game." 20

If patron has choice of screened, protected seats or unscreened
17 Murray v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., Pennsylvania, 188 A. 190 (1936).
18 Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 1 S.E. (2nd) 131 (1939).
19 Kallish v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, Pa., 10 A (2nd) 831 (1940).

20 Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Ca.. Texas. 150 S.W. (2nd) 368 (1941).
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unprotected seats, and is struck by foul ball, he ha$ not cause of action
against club.21 "Where spectator who was familiar with the game of
baseball, instead of taking a seat in the grandstand which was protected
by screening, elected to take a seat in the bleachers outside the screened
area, she was guilty of contributory negligence or there was an 'assumtion of risk' by her so as to preclude recovery from the company maintaining the baseball park for injuries sustained by the spectator when
she was struck by a wildly thrown baseball during the preliminary practice or 'warming up'." 22 When a party is at all familiar with baseball
and its surroundings he may not recover when injured by foul ball. 23
The foregoing statements give the general opinion carried by most
courts.
In Louisville in 1939 a patron took a short cut to a concession on
the dirt part underneath the stands, instead of taking the ordinary
concrete walk. In so doing he fell into a hole 3 x 3 x 3 which held shut
off valves for water. Ordinarily this was covered by a wooden cover,
but evidently some children had removed it after the game started. The
question arose as to whether or not the club owner used reasonable care
in seeing that hole was covered. This was a question for jury, then, as
to whether or not the patron was guilty of contributory negligence in
taking the short cut over the dirt. The court determined that the club
had a duty to expect people to take such a route on days when park is
crowded. The spectator should eexercise ordinary diligence in expecting
such a hazard as it was well lighted. Thus the court found for the
defendent ball club but it was a very close decision.24
The Missouri Supreme Court stated, "where spectator at a baseball
game was not a 'baseball fan' in the sense of being an enthusiastic
devotee, but was more than a casual attendant, and he ordered best
reserved seat ticket and was under the impression that he was protected
by a wire netting between himself and home plate, but while watching
the game he was struck and seriously injured by a foul ball, the operator
of baseball park and the producer of the baseball game was not negligent because of failure to protect with wire netting that portion of
the grandstand lying in line between seat occupied by spectator and
home plate, or in failing to notify spectator that he was not protected
by wire netting." 25 Such decision was in line with decisions involving
similar questions in Missouri.
While a spectator was sitting in an unscreened portion of a grandstand, a foul ball went over her head. She watched the mad scramble
for it and then returned her view to watching the game. Meanwhile, the
fan who got the ball attempated to throw it back in, but it fell short of
the field and hit the plaintiff on the head. She sued the ball club for
injuries. The Indiana Supreme Court rendered a just opinion deciding
that "she knew the danger from foul balls and the danger of such balls
being thrown back by sspectators. She had equal knowledge with the
21
22
23
24
25

Brummerhoff v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, Missouri, 149 S.W. (2nd) 382 (1941).
Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, Inc., 29 N.Y.S. (2nd) 56 (1941).
Williams v. Huston Baseball Ass'n., Texas, 154 S.W. (2nd) 874" (1941).
Louisville Baseball Club v. Butler, Kentucky, 100 S. W. (2nd) 141 (1942).
Sudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W. (2nd) 318 (1942).
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management that a spectator might attempt to return the ball after
resumption of play on the field. The spectator might have refused the
offer of a pass and retained the ball, and later have thrown it toward
playing field, the danger of a ball thrown by a spectator toward the
playing field while play is in session seems to us to be an ordinary
hazard of the game. The injured lady knew of such hazard when she
voluntarily chose the unprotected place to sit." 26
From the previous cases, we can safely conclude that a club owner is
fairly well protected as to ordinary accidents under the law, but the
"freak" incidents may find him liable for injuries.
Some of the other problems that have found their way into the courts
include a Pennsylvania case involving a situation which arose at Forbes
Field. In the decision the court held, "the rights of plaintiffs in publishing and selling for ten cents in a baseball park a copyrighted score card
containing news items of baseball teams, general baseball statistics,
ground rules, editoriials, information pertaining to the game, including
official line-up and numbers of players and teams for the particular
game to be played, were not so clear and certain as to warrant granting
of preliminary injunction in copyright infringement and unfair competition against defendant publishing and selling for five cents near
entrance gates to baseball park a score card containing line-up of
teams and numbers of players of the various teams." 27
J. L. Comiskey attempted to secure a date in Amarillo, Texas, for
an exhibition game between the Sox and Pittsburgh Pirates on their
return trip home from spring training in California. Malin was to
handle the game in Amarillo with the two clubs getting 80% and the
remaining 20% was to cover the park expense, umpires, advertising, etc.
Comisky and Malin corresponded for a great length of time; later a
representative of the Pirates joined in the correspondence. The two
clubs failed to show up as scheduled. Malin brought an action even
though no formal contract had been signed. The Texas Supreme Court
stated, "In an action against baseball clubs for breach of contract for
playing an exhibition game to be promoted by plaintiff, correspondence
between parties held to show contract consummated between partties
and that minds of all parties had met on its essential terms." 28
Special park police are employed by major league clubs a greater
part of the minor leagues. Such an officer assaulted a patron of the
Yankee Stadium. This action was committed wholly on the part of the
policeman in a wanton manner. The rule laid down here said the plaintiff could recover compensatory damages for injuries received, but no
punitive or exemplary damages would be allowed, as the act was solely
that of the police officer.29
The Mayetta Indiana Baseball Club and the Valley Falls Baseball
Club entered into an oral agreement as to winner of their game, who
was to get 60% and the loser to get 40%. The Mayetta Indians were
ahead in the ninth inning when the game broke up in a riot. Defendant
26

Emhardt v. Perry Stadium, Inc., Indiana, 40 N.E. (2nd) 704 (1943).

27 Penn Sportservice, Inc. v. Goldstein, 33 Fed. Supp. 944 (1940).
28 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Malin, 71 S.W. (2nd) 889 (1934).
29 Rainess v. American League Baseball Club of New York, 185 N.Y.S. 582 (1921).
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took all the receipts claiming game was forfeited. The plaintiff brings
his action for the 60% of the receipts. Judge Mason related, "In most
jurisdictions statutes making void all contracts or transactions based on
a gambling or wagering consideration now exist. Moreover, as a general
rule the recent decisions have refused to enforce all wagering contracts
even though they are not declared illegal by statute, holding that wagers
of all kinds are inconsistent with the established interests of society in
conflict with morals of the age and void as against public policy." 30
May a club owner eject a patron on the orders of the President of the
League? This propositiion was presented in the State of Washington.
Finnesey purchased a ticket for a home game of the Seattle Baseball
Club. After the game had started an usher quiettly asked him to see
Mr. Klepper, an officer of the club who was standing at the rear of the
grandstand. Finnesey immediately got up and went back to see Klepper
who .had two policemen with him. Klepper asked Finnesey to leave
because he was not allowed in the park by order of the League President,
McCarthy. McCarthy actixig in the interests of the Pacific Coast League,
had barred said Finnesey because of betting on games, giving money to
players, and so forth. Finnesey was forcibly ejected by the two police
officers. Maintaining that he in no way had done anythingwrong at
that time, Finnesey brings this actilon against the baseball club for
wrongful ejectnent.
The court classified the club owners as conducting a private business
and as such could revoke the license which permitted the spectator to
watch the game. Precisely it stated, "... the rule that a ticket of admission is a mere license revocable at the will of the proprietor, even after
the holder has entered the place of amusement and taken a seat.31 And
since the money paid for the ticket would be the only recoverable item
of damage shown by the proof here, and since that was refunded prior
to the bringing of the action, the disposition made of each of the causesof action was right, and the judgment is affirmed."
The Baltimore Baseball Club found itself in rather difficult straits a
quarter of a century ago, thus the following situation. The defendant
with others agreed as a part of an underwriting agreement to subscribe
shares of preferred stock in plaintiff corporation, in consideation of
shares of common stock to be transferred to him by the directors in
payment of his services, the subscription to the preferred stock to be
annulled and returned upon the sale to the public of stock in a specified
amount. The court held that the defendant could not avoid liability on
his subscription on the theory that the contract was invalid as providing
for the issuance of a bonus, since a transfer by directors to the defendant was not the issuance of stock to defendant as sa bonus. Evidence
that defendant was induced to sign by representations and assurance
of secretary of the corporation that no liability would be incurred, that
the corporation after the first baseball game of the season, would have
30 Cooney v. Hauck, 112 Kan.'662, 211 P. 617, 29 A.L.R. 427 (1923).
31 People ex rel Burnham v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 82 N.E. 169; W. W. V. Co. v.
Black. 113 Va. 728. 75 S.E. 82.
32 Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club. 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679, 30 A.L.R. 948 (1922).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
money enough for its needs and that defendant signed the paper without
reading it, was properly rejected as without probative force on the
issue of fraud.33
Carl W. Mays was suspended by Johnson, President of the American
League for desertion of his club. The facts tend to show that Mays had
been nervouse for quite a while when one afternoon he was struck by
a ball and almost immediately had a nervous breakdown. Later he went
on a fishing trop to recover and he wired the Boston Club that he would
return to pitch at any time they so desired. Mays had done all of this
with full consent of the Boston Club. Ten days after the accident at
the park, Johnson suspended Mays indefinitely. The New York Club now
owned him and they wanted the ban lifted. The court in its opinion by
Justice Wagner said that Johnson could not punish both Boston and
New York by suspension of Mays as he was doing for the League Constitiution have said power to a board of directors. The president of the
League does have the power to suspend, fine, and to inflict other disciplinary measures but here the club had the sole power to punish and the
president should not have interfered. Precisely stated it said, "In an
action by a club of the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
against the president and other club, to restrain suspension of plaintiff's player, ordered by president, wherein it was conceded that plaintiff club had primary jurisdiction to discipline player and that president
made no inquiry as to whether that jurisdiction had been exercised, and
did not call on player to explain matters, and in view of loss to plaintiff
and its assignor (Boston) the confusion of rights of club and- players
to damages to property rights, suspension would be enjoined pendete
lite." 34

Rain has long been the head-ache of all those connected with baseball. Rain insurance has helped sooth the ire of quite a few owners. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated, "Where clause in rain insurance
policy insuring operator of baseball club against loss by rainfall incidental to baseball game provided that one-tenth of an inch or more of
rainfall as recorded at city airport must fall during time specified in
policy to render insurer liable and it appeared that only .07 inches fell
at airport during such time insured could not recover on policy, notwithstanding that rain necessitated postponement of game with resulting
loss to operator, and that a trained weather observer testified that duing
the time in question he measured rainfall as .22 inches on roof of a
department store building in city." 35 In the case of Home Insurance
Company v. Denver Western Baseball Club 36 the liability of the
insurance company was absolute in case of postponement of the game
because of rain, without regard to the amount of fall and the clause
providing for measurement at a specified place applied only to coverage
for loss due to diminished attendance resulting from rain if the game
were not postponed. The policy here insured only against loss of
33 Bucher v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore. 101 A. 534 (1917).
34 American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S.
N.Y.S. 898 (1919).
35
36

Manley v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 127 N.J.L. 391, 22 A (2nd) 819 (1941).
82 Colorado 86, 257 P. 265.
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expenses, but might have been operative if the game had. been played
and total admissions had been less than expenses, in the event the
required rainfall occurred at the specified place of measurement."
A case arose in New York where a party was telephoning results of
the game inning by inning to others outside of the park. The club maintained that the news incident to the game played was a property right
and based their entire case on this point. The court refused to grant
them relief. However, if the club had maintained that a right of the
company had been infringed upon the court would have granted relief.31
The Richmond Baseball Club was suspended by the board of directors
of the Virginia League for failure to put up forfeit money. Later at
hearing they severed the Richmond Club from the League when they
failed to put up $2,000 forfeit money. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled
that "The club, a member of the league, failed to comply with that
requirement ($2,000) as expressly provided in such subsection of the
league constitution, and such failure or refusal terminated the membership of the plaintiff's club in the league." 38 Further, "there is a marked
difference between a voluntary association with rules and one without.
If lawful rules are made for the government of the members they must
be conformed to until they are regularly changed. So long as they are
in force they are the law of the association and must be obeyed." 39
Mr. Rush had commenced to build a grandstand and fence at and
around the baseball grounds at Minot, North Dakota. The plaintiffs in
the case, residents of Minot, felt that Rush should be restrained by
injunction from building this ball park. They believed that the large
crowds, the noise, confusion, and traffic would interfer with the quiet
of their homes and they asked that the game be called a nuisance. The
court was reluctant to grant the remedy the plaintiff sought because
baseball is not a nuisance per se. If a nuisance arose here, it would
only be after the park was completed and the annoyance of the crowds,
etc., became a fact, then the plaintiff might have redress in this cause.40
The court said, "In all cases cited by plaintiffs here, baseball games
apparently had been conducted with resulting annoyance, discomfort
and in some cases actual trespass upon the property of the plaintiffs.41
The injury had already been received, ball games had been played and
had been attended with the injurious consequence of which the complainants complained. Such was not the situation here.
Kenesaw M. Landis, High Commissioner of baseball, demonstrated
with an "iron hand" that he ruled baseball. The facts went so that
Bennett was under contract to Little Rock in 1926. The same year he
was assigned to Tulsa, finishing that year and all of 1927. Tulsa in turn
assigned Bennett to the St. Louis Browns in 1928. Later, the Browns
gave up their option on him and he signed for the season of 1928 with
37 National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 Fed. Supl. 488 (1936).
38 Bradley v. Wilson, 138 Va. 605, 123 S.E. 273 (1924).
89 Ostrom v. Green, 161 N.Y. 353, 55 N. E. 919.
40

Riffey v. Rush, 51 N.D. 188, 199 N.W. 523 (1924).

41 Cronin v. Bloemecke. 58 N. J. Eq. 313, 43 A. 605; Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 27, B3A. 289; Seastream v. N. J. Ex. Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 178, 58A.
682.
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Tulsa again. In September of 1928 Tulsa assigned Bennett to Milwaukee.
In December, 1928, the Brewers assigned him to Wichita Falls. He
signed with Wichita Falls in 1929. The same year Pittsburgh offered to
buy him for $10,000 but St. Louis bought him later for $5,000. The
Browns asked for waivers in 1930 and the Yankees and Pirates requested
Bennett for $7,500. St. Louis turned down both offers and Bennett signed
in March, 1930. The Browns then optioned him out to Milwaukee, subject
to recall. Bennett then signed with the Brewers.
Meanwhile, Landis instituted an investigation and found Ball practically owned the St. Louis Ball Club along with controlling the Tulsa,
Wichita Falls, and Milwaukee clubs. The question for decision, therefore,
was whether, under the code governing organized baseball, an individual
controlling a major league club may so manipulate his control of a
number of minor league clubs also, as in the end to achieve a situation
whereby a player originally acquired by purchase by the major club
thus controlled may be sold and transferred back and forth from the
major clubs to the minor clubs and back again for an indefinite period
of time, in excess of two years, under apparent outright sales agreements, without disclosing to the other major clubs the secret control
mentioned and without furnishing opportunity to them to claim the
players' services.
The Federal Court handed down this ruling, "The commissioner of
organized baseball is authorized to disapprove option contract between
ball club assigning existing agreement with player, but reserving right
to recall under agreement defining powers of baseball commissioner, term
conduct detrimental to baseball code. Good faith submission to arbiter is
proper, and decision is binding, unless unsupported by evidence, or without legal foundation." 42
The Macon ball club borrowed $5,000 fro mthe plaintiff and signed
a contract that upon the sale of a certain player, plaintiff should have
as a guarantee, the money received from such sale. The Georgia court
ruled, "In a suit on a contract whereby defendant baseball club promised
plaintiff proceeds of the sale of defendant's player whether defendant
transferred player under "cover deal" violating rules of organized baseball and whether such deal was fraudulent as to third persons is
immaterial. This was so, since the sole question involved is whether
defendant baseball clube had in fact received payment for the player
in question, and if so, the amount of such payment." 43
We realize that there are scores of cases that have not come to our
attention, but organized baseball is no longer small in size, for it now
includes huge parks, thousands of personnel, great pecuniary investments and other important matters. It was through the tireless efforts
of far sighted men that baseball, today and always, is America's national
pastime.
Thomas F. Halligan
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Milwaukee American Ass'n. v. Landis, 40 Fed. (2nd) 298 (1931).

43 Macon Baseball Ass'n. v. Pennington, 45 Ga. App. 611, 166 S.E. 35 (1932).
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PRIORITY AS TO FXXTURES IN MISSOUPr.The law on this subject is
in a state of confusion among the several states. It is only by a study
of the law of)each individual state that any orderly decision may be
made. This discussion will be limited, therefore, to the law on this subject
in the state of Missouri.
The first step in any state in determining priority is to examine the
statutes governing the filing or recording of the instruments under discussion. The statute governing the recording of conditional sales in
Missouri declares that the condition in the contract between buyer and
seller that the title to the personal property shall remain in the seller
until the property is paid for "shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers in good faith, and creditors, unless such condition shall be
evidenced by writing executed, acknowledged and recorded as provided
in cases of mortgages on personal property." I
The statute governing the recording of chattel mortgages in Missouri
is as follows:
"No mortgage or deed of trust of personal property hereafter
made shall be valid against any other person than the parties
thereto, unless possession of the mortgages or trust property be
delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or trustee or cest'
que trust, or unless the mortgage or deed of trust be acknowledged
or proved and recorded in the county in which the mortgagor or
grantor resides, in such manner as conveyances of land are by
law directed to be acknowledged or proved and recorded, or unless
the mortgage or deed of trust or a true copy thereof, shall be filed
in the office of the recorder of deeds in the county where the mortgagor or grantor executing the same resides, and in the case of
the City of St. Louis, with the recorder of deeds for said city, or,
where such grantor is a non-resident of the state, then in the
office of the recorder of deeds of the county or city where the property mortgaged was situated at the time of executing such mortgage or deed of trust; and such recorder shall indorse on such
instrument or copy the time of receiving the same, and shall keep
the same in his office for the inspection of all persons; and such
mortgage or deed of trust, or copy thereof, may be so filed,
although not acknowledged, and shall be as valid as though the
instrument were fully spread upon the records of the county, or
in the case of the City of St. Louis, upon the records of said city,
in the office of the recorder of deeds; and such instrument when
acknowledged and recorded, or when the same, or a copy thereof,
shall have been filed, as above provided, shall thenceforth be
notice of the contents thereof to all the world." 2
The statutes governing the recording of real estate mortgages in
Missouri provide that they shall be recorded in the office of the recorder
of the county in which such real estate is situated 3 and that the
recording shall be notice to all persons of the contents and all subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed, in law and in equity, to
purchase with notice.4 The statutes also provide that the instrument
shall not be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have
1 Rev. St. of
2 Rev. St. of
3 Rev. St. of
4 Rev. St. of

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

1939,
1939,
1939,
1939,

sec.
sec.
sec.
sec.

3516.
3486.
3426.
1427.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder
for recording.5
It is well at this point to make a few distinctions between the effect
of unrecorded chattel mortgages and unrecorded conditional sales contracts. An unrecorded chattel mortgages is invalid as to everyone except
the parties and regardless whether the purchaser or mortgagee is prior
or subsequent or has notice makes no difference,6 but the unrecorded
conditional sales contract however is only void as to subsequent purchasers and if the purchaser has notice it is valid as to him,.7 it being
invalid or void as to him only if he is a purchaser in good faith.8
As to the question of what kind of property, and method of attaching
the property to the realty, will become a fixture will be left for another
subject, it sufficing here to cite a rule laid down in the case of American
Clay Machinery Co. vs. Sedalia Brick and Tile Co. which rule was that
in the absence of any express stipulation by which personalty sold to be
attached to realty is to retain its character as personalty, the question
whether it becomes a part of the freehold depends upon three conditions:
Annexation real or constructive; adaptability to the purposes of the
realty; and the intent of the parties, which is controlling.
Now as to the question of who has priority between a prior mortgagee
of the realty and a subsequent conditional seller, or a subsequent chattel
mortgagee, where there is a provision in the contract that the property
so attached to the realty shall remain personalty? In such a case where
the chattel mortgage is recorded the property so affixed to the realty
bears the mortgage lien upon it. The case of General Motors Acceptance
Corp. vs. Farm and Home Savings & Loan Ass'n.1O held on this point
that where a conditional sales contract provided that conduits and tubing
for refrigeration system should become part of the building, and compressors, cooling coils, and refrigerators remain personalty, last mentioned, as between prior mortgagee and assignee of chattel mortgage
given under sales contract, remained personalty unless removal thereof
would, as of time of installation, substantially and adversely affect realty
mortgagee's security. The prior realty mortgagee, in relation to party
installing chattel, was held to stand in same position as landowner,
except that article does not retairr character of personalty if removal
would materially damage structure or impair mortgagee's security. The
contract was held to be valid concerning the character of the property
and the contract governed. The sales contract in this case was not
recorded and the chattel mortgage was not given until after installation
of the refrigeration equipment and then not recorded until three days
after its execution but this was held by the court not to prevent the
property from retaining its character of personalty as to the prior
5
6

Rev. St. of Mo. 1939, sec. 3428.
Musselman vs City of Joplin, Mo. App. 180 S. W. 1058 (1915).

7 Ibid.
8

Seitz vs. Hudson, Mo. App. 106 1. W. (2d) 523 (1937).

9 174 Mo. App. 485 160 S. W.
10 Mo. App. 58 S. W.

902, (1913).

(2d) 338 (1933).
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mortgagee. In the case of Fred W. Wolf Co. vs. Herman Savings Bank,11
the court held that a conditional sale of machinery placed in a plant
covered by a prior mortgage, will be enforced as against the mortgagee,
where such machinery may be removed without substantial injury to
the freehold or to the security had at the time of its addition to the
plant; the tendency of the law being to relax the old rule as to annexation
to the freehold, and to adjust the rights of the parties on equitable
principles, even where the severance of machinery might impair the
security of a prior mortgage to some extent. The court said a seller,
by a contract of conditional sale, has the option of pursuing his remedy
at law for the recovery of the property, or to treat the unpaid purchase
price as a lien on the property, and to sue in equity for the enforcement
thereof.
The conditional sales contract under the statute making conditional
sales void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith unless
the condition be evidenced by writing recorded as provided in cases of
mortgages of personal property, is still held to be valid and not void as
2
to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees with notice.1
The next question to arise is whether the recording of the conditional
sales contract and also the chattel mortgage is notice to the subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee so as to make him subject to the clauses and
conditions found in the prior sales contract and chattel mortgage. The
only case on this point decided in Missouri appears to be that of Kelvinator St. Louis Inc. vs. Schader,13 where the court posed this question;
whether the filing of the chattel mortgage in the city of St. Louis covering appliances place in a building in St. Louis county, furnishes such
constructive notice as will enable the mortgagee to recover the property
in question as against a third person not having actual notice. The court
said that the Missouri statutes not only requires that every instrument
in writing that conveys real estate shall be proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed and shall be recorded in the
county in which such real estate is situated, but it also requires that
every instrument in writing whereby any real estate may be affected,
shall likewise be proved or acknowledged and certified and recorded
in the office in the county in which such real estate is situated. All other
matters affecting real estate are required to be filed and recorded in
the county where the real estate is located, and therefore it would be
useless to file a deed of trust, a notice of lis pendens, a leasehold or a
mechanic's lien claim in any other county than that in which the property is located. If, therefore, it is necessary to prevent an article from
becoming a fixture by reason of the fact that- it is a part of a complete
system, that the mortgage affecting the same shall be recorded in the
county where the real estate is situated, a recording thereof in any
other place would be as ineffectual as if it was not recorded at all, and
consequently would only be binding the parties to the mortgage, and
;,1 168 Mo. App. 549 153 S. W. 1094 (1913).
12 American Clay Machinery Co. vs. Sedalia Brick & Tile Co. 14 Mo. App. 480
160 S. W. 902 (1913).
13 Mo. App. 39 S. W. (2d) 385. (1931).
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would furnish no notice to third parties.14 The court went on to say
in order to furnish constructive notice the chattel mortgage must appear
in the chain of title to the realty. The case cited Jones on Chattel Mortgages (5th Ed.) sec. 134 "And the better opinion is, that a purchaser
of the realty is bound only to take notice of the record title of the
realty, and is not in any way bound to examine the records for chattel
mortgages upon fixtures of such realty." To uphold its view the court
also cited cases from Texas,15 Georgia,16 and Iowa.17 There is a definite
conflict on this question 18 but the holding in Missouri seems now to be
settled by this case. This case applied-only to a chattel mortgage and did
not decide the question of whether a recorded conditional sales contract
would be constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in
regard to fixtures but the rule laid down and particularly the reasoning
behind the rule is sufficiently broad to encompass a conditional sales
contract. It would be illogical to decide otherwise for the statute governing the recording of conditional sales provides that it shall be recorded
in the same manner as a mortgage on personal property therefore it
would certainly not be logical to decide a chattel mortgage recorded in
its proper place is not notice because not in the chain of title to the
realty and to decide a conditional sales is notice when recorded in the
same manner and also not appearing in the chain of title.
Where there is a prior realty mortgage with an acquired property
clause then the Missouri rule is that as to a subsequent seller or mortgagee or lien holder who sells chattel to the owner to be affixed to the
realty, the mortgage of the realty operates only by way of equitable
estoppel, and is effectual only against the mortgagor and his privies
in contract. It can attach to such property only in the condition in which
it comes into the mortgagor's possession.19
The conclusion drawn from this discussiion then is that a prior mortgagee of the realty has no prior right against a subsequent recorded
conditional seller or chattel mortgagee of fixtures unless he has an after
acquired property clause and only then when the chattel is affixed without the other interest being executed. In other words it must come into
the mortgagor's possession free from liens or encumbrances that are
recorded before the prior realty mortgagee has any right to it as part
of the freehold.
In order for the property to remain personalty as to a subsequent
mortgagee of the realty the chattel mortgage or the conditional sales
contract must be recorded and appear in the chain of title to the realty
or he must have actual notice of it.
14 Ibid.. p. 389.
15 Phillips vs. Newsome, Tex. Civ. App. 179 S. W. 1123, 1124 (1915).
Ice, Light & Water Co. vs. Lone Star E. & B. Works 1 Tex. Civ. App. 694, 41
S. W. 835, 837 (1897).
16 Shinner vs. Stewart Plumbing Co. Ga. App. 155 S. E. 97, 98 (1930).
17 Bringholff vs. Mungemaier, 20 Iowa 513 (1866).
18 See Jones on Chattel Mortgages (5th. Ed.) Sec. 134.
19 Landesman vs. Gmuersell, 16 Mo. App. 454. 459 (1885).
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By a peculiar construction of the statute governing conditional sales
contracts the courts have effectively thwarted the intention of the legislators. The statute provides that unless recorded they are void to subsequent purchasers in good faith, and creditors. The courts hold that the
provision as to good faith does not apply to creditors of the conditional
vendee, but applies only to purchasers from him.20 They hold the
unrecorded conditional sales contract void as to creditors prior and
subsequent, even with notice.21
Hal E. Hunter, Jr.

PRICE FIXING AND ESTABLISHING MINIMUMX WAGES.--Statutes have
been passed in recent years by the legislatures of the several states
authorizing the fixing of prices and the establishing of minimum wages,
under the police power of the state, for certain designated types of businesses. The legislatures, having neither the time nor the required expert
knowledge to competently administer these laws, have delegated the
actual administration of the laws to administrative boards set up for
the purpose. Thus the field of administrative law has been extended and
broadened.

The first question to arise under this new legislation is, of course,
the validity of the acts themselves. These acts pertain to businesses of
public interest and acts fixing the prices of commodities or services have
been upheld, under the police power of the government, in regard to
milki and cleaning and laundrying services.2 In a recent opinion a
Florida court held that the test of the power of the legislature to fix
prices is not always whether the business is affected with a public interest, but whether the business should be regulated in the interest of the
public.3 This same court also held that if the legislative regulation of
a business involves the question or price limitation, the regulation will
be upheld unless clearly4 shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or beyond the power of the legislature to enforce.5 It has been held that laws
providing for the establishment of minimum wages and maximum hours
of employment, when and to the extent necessary for the protection of
health or morals of employees, may be enacted under the authority
of the state's police power.6
20 Gilbert Book Co. vs. Sheridan, 114 Mo. App. 332, 89 S. W. 555 (1905).
21 Patten vs. Phoenix Buick Co. 105 Ark. 22. 150 S. W. 116 (1912).
1 State cz rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co. 179 A. 116, 118
N. J. Eq. 504, 1935.
Highland Farms Dairy, Ind. v. Agnew, 16 Fed. Supp. 575, 1936.
2 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Clezning and Laundry Board, 183 So. 759 (Fla.)
1938.
3 Ibid.
4 Italics mine.
5 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Cleaning and Laundry Board, 183 So. 759 (Fla.)
1938.
6 Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 90 Pac. (2d)
899 (Okla.) 1939.
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This delegation of duties by the legislature to the administrative body
and the question of whether it is a valid delegation, depends upon the
type of power delegated. It is held that the power to determine the law's
policy is primarily legislative and is not to be delegated but the power
to make rules of subordinate character to carry out that policy and
apply it to varying conditions, though partaking of legislative character,
is in its dominant aspects, administrative and delegable.7
The questions as to whether the legislature has the power to pass
such a law and whether it may validly delegate its power to an administrative body are important but they pertain to the validity of the law
itself rather than to the validity of the board's acts under the law. The
most important topic, and the one that will be considered primarily here,
is the necessity for notice and hearing in the actions of the board.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. IndustrialCommission of Minnesota,8 the court held that to determine what constituted a minimum
living wage for women and minors under the standards fixed by this
particular act would require something more than mere administrative
or executive action. The court said it would seem to require the exercise
of judgment in determining questions of fact and also the gathering and
weighing of evidence, and unless it was merely executive action its procedure must include a full hearing, and there must be evidence before
the commission. A Florida case9 laid down the rule that the fact that
regulations of a trade or business are promulgated by an authorized
board, even though they may include price fixing, if the price fixing is
done after hearing and notice, will not render the regulations violative
of due process and equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
These cases requiring notice and hearing bring forth the question as
to when the hearing must be held, that is, at what point in the proceedings of the administrative board, and also the question of what kind of
hearing is necessary? The Supreme Court of Utah has attempted to
answer these questions in a recent case decided under a statute setting
up an Industrial Commission to establish minimum wages and the statute
required a notice and a hearing. The court held that under the "due
process" clause, it is not necessary that a hearing be had at any particular stage of the proceedings by which rights may be affected or that the
hearing be had before a regularly constituted court of justice, but it is
necessary that a hearing be given at some time and that it be had before
some officer, bureau, board or court to whom the person whose property
is affected may present his evidence, objections and argument to the
end that the officer, tribunal or court may be enabled fairly and intelligently to pass and determine the questions presented for decision. There
must be a full and public hearing at which there must be sufficient evidence taken to support necessary findings of facts. As to the evidence
the court held that the taking of evidence was necessary for the validity
7 Ibid.
8 24 Fed. Supp. 870, 1938.
9 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Cleaning and Laundry Board, 183 So. 759 (Fla.)
1938.
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of the order and the board could not treat as evidence that which is not
evidence, though the board is not bound by the technical rules of evidence. The court defined hearing as the hearing of evidence and arguments.10
A New Jersey casell decided in 1935 deserves notice on this question.
The Legislature of New Jersey declared an emergency and passed a law
setting up a board empowered to fix the price of milk. The court first of
all held it to be a valid exercise of the police power-the test applied was
whether it was discriminatory or arbitrary. The statute did not require
notice and hearing. The court held that in the absence of specific constitutional or statutory requirements, notice of proceedings an administrative body or a hearing before such body is not requisite to valid action
by the board, the demand of "due process" being satisfied by the right
of judicial review on notice. Therefore the court held that the fixation
of minimum prices by the Milk Control Board without notice to the milk
dealer or opportunity afforded him to be heard was not a denial of "due
process.' The decision in this case appears to be very favorable to the
extension of administrative law. One explanation of the case might be
found in that for the reason that the legislature declared an emergency
the court decided that if every dealer had to be given notice and hearing
the actual emergency nature of the measure might be frustrated by the
time element involved in giving every dealer a notice and hearing. However plausible that may sound it is the only reasonable explanation for
the decision in that case. Another case seemingly on the same point and
with much the same decision, though founded on different reasons, was
decided in 1920.12 A law was passed creating an Industrial Welfare
Commission and authorizing it to fix minimum wages for women. The
court held that it was not invalid as working a deprivation of property
without "due process" of law because there was no provision for notice
to employers. The Commission's action was administrative and not judicial. In arriving at this decision the court cited the case of Miller Telephone Co. v.Minimum Wage Commission, a Minnesota case which held
an administrative board must be permitted to exercise judgment and
discretion in working out details and making administrative regulations
but such action was still not judicial so as to require notice and hearing.13 This case then also decided that notice and hearing were not
necessary but its reason was not the emergency angle of the act but
they decided that such action was not judicial but was administrative.
Now if the action of the board was administrative all courts will go
along with this court and hold notice and hearing are not necessary but
few of the courts will declare such action of the board administrative
action, but will say that it is more than administrative action and notice
and hearing are necessary.14
10 Megreto v. Industrial Commission, 85 Pac. (2d) 608, 1938.
11 State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co. 179 A. 116, 118
N. J. Eq. 504.
12 Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 194 Pac. 595, 1i3 Wash. 359, 1920.
13 177 N. W. 341, 145 Minn. 262, 1920.
14 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Commission of Minnesota, 24 Fed.
Supp. 370, 1938.
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It has been held that because a statute did not provide for notice and
nearing before the administrative tribunal the statute itself was unconstitutional regardless of the tribunal's action.15 However the better
view here is to hold the statute constitutional on the grounds that there
is an implied notice and hearing provided even though not specifically
provided for in the statute. This is done on the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every statute. In this latter view the board's
action may be attacked because no notice or hearing was given but the
statute will be held constitutional.
The question of whether judicial review is provided for in the statute
or whether it is limited or ruled out by the statute is important in some
cases. One case, decided in 1936, the legislature declared an emergency
and necessity for regulation of the milk business and a Milk Commission was set up to administer the act. The act failed to provide for judicial review in the courts. It was held that the failure to provide for
judicial review in the act in relation to price fixing did not make the act
invalid as a denial of "due process." Access to the courts always exists
and it is only when a board's action is attempted to be made conclusive
is there a denial of due process.16 In another case the act before the
court limited judicial review to questions of law and the court held that
the limitation imposed by the act would be ignored but the act was not
invalidated thereby.17
It has been seen that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to
a legislative act but there is also a presumption, attaching to administrative board's actions. It is held that there is a presumption of the
existence of facts suflicient to justify an exertion of the police power
attaching to an order of an administrative body as well as to statutes
and municipal ordinances and such a presumption is strengthened where
a regulation was adopted after notice and public hearing.18
From the above discussion and cases it will be seen that price fixing
and establishing minimum wages by administrative boards or tribunals
is now virtually settled as constitutional and, if notice and hearing provided by the tribunal in its action, the action of the tribunal will be
upheld as valid-and in some cases it will be upheld though notice and
hearing are not given. It would seem then, that the extension of administrative law is welcomed by most courts, rather than frowned upon, and
the future field of administrative law has been extended by the very
broadness of the decisions. At the present then the field of administrative law is looked on favorably by the courts but as to what the future
may bring that is also for the courts to decide on the facts and circumstances which may arise in future years in regard to administrative law
and the actions of administrative tribunals and boards.
Hal E. Hunter, Jr.
15 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 247
Pac. 162, 76 Mont. 305, 1926.
16 Highland Farina Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 16 Fed. Supp. 575, 1936.
17 Assodiated Industries of OklaoJwma v. Industril Welfare Commission, 90 Pac.
(2d) 899 (Okla.), 1939.

18 Pacific States Boz and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 1935.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS: WITH REGARD TO AN ATTORNEY WITNESSING A WIL.-An extremely interesting question is brought up when
,n attorney is called upon to testify at the probate of a will. This question is: can an attorney testify as to the execution and communications
of the testator to him when the will was drawn? Two different situations
arise under this question which must be examined. The first is, can the
attorney testify as to these facts if he was not a witness to the will, and
can he testify if he was a subscribing witness? These two situations
must be distinguished carefully. The real difference lies in the distinction between an attesting and a subscribing witness. To attest the publication of a last will and to subscribe to the will the name of witnesses
are very different things and are aimed at distinct ends.
It is said that "attestation is the act of the senses; subscription is
the act of the hand; the one is mental; the other mechanical; and to
attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the
facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the
names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification."1 Thus it
seems that by attestation is meant the act of witnessing in its full legal
import; and by subscription is meant the signing of one's name which
implies that the act of attesting has been performed.
At this point it is interesting to note what the general rule is concerning communications to an attorney made in connection with the
drawing of a will during the testator's life. It seems to be held that
transactions and communications between the attorney and the testator
are regarded as privileged communications.2 The courts have ruled thus
in this manner because no grounds or reason seem to be present, while
the testator is alive, to take such communications out from under the
general rule of prohibiting disclosure of such transactions and confidences.
Now with the distinction between attesting and subscribing in mind
let us examine the first situation; namely, can an attorney who is merely
an attesting witness testify at trial as to the confidential communications which have been .given him by the testator.
Under our statutes which change and modify the common law, some
have provided that an attorney cannot testify as to confidential communications made to him in his professional capacity, by a client without
the consent of such client.3 However, this general rule causes a great
deal of difficulty when an attorney is offered as a witness to establish
the execution of a will. But in the case of O'Brien 'V. Spaulding4 it was
held "that an attorney of the testator may testify as to the facts of exe1

Schouler, On Wills, Executors and Administration, 6th Ed., Vol. 1, Chapter 12,

p. 587.
2 See In re Dominici Estate, 151 Calif. 181, 90 P. 448, (1907).
Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1004, (1900).
3 Page, On Wills, §364.
4 102 Ga. 490, 31 S. E. 100, (1897).
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cution, that he incorporated the testator's instructions into the will as
executed, and the testator was sane." Then in the case of Turner's
Appeal5 it was held "to be proper to require an attorney to testify to
conversations had between himself and decedent which were confidential
but not professional, as a basis for inquiring into his opinion of the
mental condition of decedent." These cases seem to represent that an
attorney can be called as a witness where he attested the will. These
cases also cast doubt on the principle that an attorney who is an attesting witness is not permitted to testify. These two cases above, however,
do make the point concerning communications made to an attorney in
his professional capacity and those made otherwise.
The weight of authority and the better view seems to be that "unless
otherwise provided by statute, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in respect to that document and all transactions occurring between them leading up to its execution are not, after
the client's death within the rule as to privileged communications, in a
suit between the testator's devisees and heirs at law, or other parties
who all claim under him."6
There is a good reason behind this view which allows an exception to
the rule which excludes confidential professional communications. It is
said that "the rule is designed for the protection of the client, and it
cannot be said to be for the testator, in a controversy between parties
all of whom claim under him, to have those declarations and transactions excluded which are necessary to the proper fulfilment of his will."7
This reason was laid down in the famous case of In re Young8 in Utah.
However, some courts have advanced a rather different and unique
reason for this exception to the privileged communication rule. These
courts base their reason on an implied waiver of the rule by the testator.
These courts say that "a client, by requesting his attorney to draw his
will, impliedly asks him to do and say whatever may at any time and
place be requisite for the purpose of establishing the integrity of the
will, thereby waiving the protection of privileged communications and
releasing the attorney from his obligation of secrecy."9
Further than this, it can be said that the courts have held that "the
privilege with respect to communications to an attorney does not attach
to statements made by him or the testator during the preparation of a
will, in a proceeding to contest the will on the ground of coercion, duress,
and undue influence, either at the common law or under a statute merely
declaratory of the common law privilege."1o Thus in a proceeding to
6 72 Conn. 305, 44 A. 310, (1899).
6 In re Loree's Estate, 158 Mich. 372, 122 N.W. 623. (1909)

In re Doininci Estate, 151 Calif. 181, 90 P. 448, (1907)
See 64 A. L. R. 184.
7 28 R.C.L. 550.
8 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731, (1908). Also see In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578,
85 P. 688. (1905).

9 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 110.
10 28 R.C.L. 551.
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establish a lost will, the attorney who drafted the will, who was present
at the time of its execution, who saw the will, after the death of the
testator in the possession of the testator's family, and who had read and
recalled its principal provisions, was a competent witness to prove these
facts.11 In the case of In re Young,12 supra, the court held that a former will could also be proved by the testimony of an attorney. The court
of Illinois said in Champion v. McCarthy13 that this doctrine under
consideration (that the communications between the attorney and client,
the testator, are not privileged) applies with peculiar force where the
attorney acts practically as a mere subscriber and not as a legal advisor
and is competent to testify.
With the view in mind that where the attorney acts merely as an
attesting witness, let us see how different cases apply or reject this
doctrine. In Massachusetts, the court said in Phillips v. Chasel4 that
"privileged communications between attorney and client are not admissible under the Massachusetts statute unless expressly waived by the
decedent's executor or administrator, or unless there is an implied
waiver justifying admission from the fact that the declaration contains
a request for disclosure after decedent's death." There the Massachusetts
court says that the transactions between attorney and client are privileged unless the representatives of the estate or an implied waiver of
the rule are made from the instrument. This represents a view held by
several states. It will be discussed more fully under the subject of waiver
of the privilege rule. Then in the case of Cunningham v. Cunninghaml5
the court said that in an action to set aside a will on the ground of
undue influence, the attorney who drew it may relate the facts and circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will to
show that the testator was not under an improper restraint, communications with the testator under these circumstances not being privileged."
And, "in an action to set aside a will on the ground of mental incapacity,
communications between the attorney who drew the will and the testator,
at the time of its preparation, are not inadmissible, to show the mental
condition of the testator, on the ground that they are privileged." Thus
the court in Kansas goes along fully with the exception to the rule of
privileged communications.
Then in the case of In re Healyl6 the court said the testimony of an
attorney who drew the will as to conversations with the testator before
and after the time the instrument was executed, were admissible, where
the contest of the will was on the ground of fraud and undue influence.
Chief Justice Knowlton of Massachusetts said in 201 Mass. 44917
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Graham v. O'Fallen, 4 Mo. 338, (1836).
Inlow v. Hughes, 38 Ind. App. 375, 76 N. E. 763, (1906).
33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731, (1908).
220 Ill.87, 81 N. E. 808, (1907).
201 Mass. 444, 87 N. E. 755. (1909).
107 Kan. 318, 191 P. 294, (1920).
9404. 128, 109 A. 19, (1920).
Phillips et aiv. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755, (1909).
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"It is for the protection and benefit of the client so that his disclosure
may not be used against him in a controversy with third persons. He,
(the testator) may waive it, and if there is a controversy after his
death, between his estate and those claiming adversely to it, the privilege
may be waived by his executor or administrator. But where the controversy is not between an estate and persons claiming against it, but is to
determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person, and both parties claim under him, the reason for the privilege does
not exist, and neither set up a claim of privilege against the other."
In the case of In re Wunsch's Estate18 the Minnesota court held
that "on appellant's application to share in his grandfather's estate on
the ground that unintentionally he had been omitted from the will
whereby the grandfather disposed of his estate, the communications
between the testator and the attorney who drew and attested the will
were properly received in evidence and were not privileged." The court
discussed privileged communications and how the very essence of the
rule is to protect the client, but after the testator's death, it is to the
interest of the client to have the attorney testifying as to his wishes. The
court said that the testator can waive the protection of the rule, and this
waiver may be either expressed or implied.
Finally in Michigan, the court said in Lorees Estate19 that "communications between attorney and client during the preparation of a
will are not privileged but are admissible in a contest especially when
between parties not strangers to the estate." The court upheld and cited
In re Young, supra.
Summing up the first situation certain points must be noted. First,
where an attorney acts merely as a scrivener of a will, his knowledge of
the law does not put his actions in the class of privileged communications. Secondly, where the attorney draws up the will and has communications with the testator during the preparation of the will, the rule of
privileged communications is either waived expressly or by implication
in cases of contest on the ground of coercion, fraud, or undue influence
on the testator. The reason being that the rule is for the protection of
the testator, and by allowing the attorney to testify by removing the
communication from the rule, the interests of the testator are carried
out and protected more fully. Thirdly, where the attorney is an attesting witness to the execution of the will, his testimony is not under the
rule for the same reason. However, in this latter case, there is a stronger reason for construing an implied waiver because by the testator
making the attorney witness, he surely wants him to be free to testify
as to the testator's intention and act.
Now let us turn to our second situation, namely: Can an attorney
testify at a contest of a will if he was a subscribing witness? From a
survey of the cases and authorities it seems to be the general rule "that
18
19

177 Minn. 169, 225 N. W. 109, (1929).
158 Mich. 372, 122 N. W. 623, (1909).
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where a testator requests the attorney who drafted the will and with
whom he has consulted in regard thereto, to sign the will as an attesting witness, and the attorney does so, his testimony with reference to
the transaction and communications between the two of them at the
time are not inadmissible as privileged, in an action to establish or contest the will-the usual reason given being that the testator, by his act,
has in effect consented that, whenever the will shall be offered for probate, the attorney may be called as a witness and testify to any facts in
his knowledge necessary to establish the validity of the will; in other
words, that there is a waiver by the testator of the pledge of secrecy
imposed by the rule as to privileged communications.20
A serious question arises as to where states have statutes which
prevent an attorney from testifying unless he has the consent of his
client. However, two means have been used by the courts in construing
these statutes which allow an attorney to testify outside the privileged
rule. The first is that these statutes are merely declaratory of the common law rule which made these present cases an exception to the rule.
Secondly the courts have said that when the testator has the attorney
sign the will as a subscribing witness, he waives the privilege rule by his
act, and the attorney can testify notwithstanding the statute. In direct
line with this construction, the court of New York in the case of In re
Coleman2l said "where the attorney who drew the will is requested by
the testator to become a subscribing witness thereto, there is an express
waiver of the privilege within statutory provisions, although the waiver
does not permit the attorney to give testimony which would vary the
terms of the will."
An interesting reason is also apparent if all the cases are rationalized
together. This is that when the attorney becomes a subscribing witness,
the testator has not only waived the rule of privilege, but also the attorney is released from his professional capacity so as to assume the new
duties of a witness to the will with all its imports and consequences.
In the light of these statements let us turn to some of the notable
cases decided on the subject. For example in McMaster v. Scriven22 the
court said that "where the attorney drew the will and acted as a subscribing witness, he may testify to such facts of execution as were communicated to him in his professional capacity by the testator." The
reason for this rule is based on the ground. that when the testator asks
the attorney to be a subscribing witness, he impliedly consents that the
attorney can testify to any communications between them concerning the
will. Then in Kern v. Kern23 the Indiana court said that "an attorney
who drew the decedent's will and was a subscribing witness thereto is
competent to testify to its contents." The court in this case implies that
the rule as to privileged communications with regard to wills applies
only during the client's lifetime.
20 64 A.L.R. 192, annotation.
21 111 N. Y. 220, 19 N. E. 71, (1888).
22 85 Wis. 162, 55 N. W. 149, (1893).
23 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E., 1004, (1900).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Wisconsin, the court held in the case of In re Pitt's Estate24 that
"where an attorney who drew a will signs it as a witness at the request
of testator, he is free in an action to contest the will, to testify to any
fact in regard to the will and its execution which he learned by virtue
of his professional relation." The same court in the case of In re
Cramers Estate25 makes a good distinction between cases where an attorney is an attesting witness and where he is a subscribing witness. It
said that "communications between attorney and client about a will
were privileged and not admissible at trial as to changes desired by testatrix." Then the court said, "An attorney could testify as to the circumstances of a will and all changes so discussed by testatrix if the
attorney were made a witness to the will."
In the case of O'Brien v. Spalding26 the court said "certainly where
the client had his attorney sign the will as an attesting witness, he has
in effect consented that, whenever the will should be offered for probate,
the attorney might be called as a witness and testify to any facts within
his knowledge necessary to establish the validity of the will." Then in
the case of Baird v. Detrick27 the Ohio court said that "where a testator
procures his attorney as a subscribing witness to his will he thereby
expressly consents that such attorney may testify as fully as any other
subscribing witness and thereby waives the exception of the statute."
In Ohio there is a statute concerning privileged communications.
More directly on this question of waiver, the court in Michigan held
in the case of Passmore v. Passmore28 that "in absence of statutory
provisions to the contrary, the right to prohibit the disclosure of communications between an attorney and his client belongs to the client and
not to the attorney. Therefore, the client may renounce or waive it at
his pleasure, and where he does so the attorney is bound to answer."
Then in Massachusetts under its statutory provisions, the court said in
Philipps et al. v. Chase29 that privilege may be waived not only by
the client but also by his personal representative or apparently in a
proper case by his heirs." Finally in the case of O'Brien v. Spalding,30
the court held that "an attorney who became a subscribing witness to a
writing, even though he is the counsel of one of the parties thereto, may
be required to testify as fully as other subscribing witnesses to the execution and the circumstances attending the execution of the writing. By
making him a witness, his client is deemed to have waived all objections
to his testifying in respect to such matters."
Thus in summary to the second situation it can be noted generally
that there is an even stronger case made for allowing an attorney to
testify as to a will as an exception to the rule of privileged communica24 85 Wis. 162, 55, N. W. 149, (1893).
25 183 Wis. 525, 198, N. W. 386, (1924).
26 102 Ga. 490, 81 S. E. 100 (1897).
27 8 Ohio App. 198, (1917).

28 50 Mich. 626, 16 N. W. 170, (1883).
29 201 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755, (1909).
30 102 Ga. 490, 31 S.E. 100 (1897).

NOTES'
tions when he is made a subscribing witness. There seems to be two
sound reasons advanced by the courts. The first is that by having the
attorney become a subscribing witness the client for whose benefit the
rule applies, expiessly waives the protection of the rule so that the attorney may testify to all facts necessary to establish the validity of the
will. Secondly, by making an attorney a subscribing witness, the testator
wants him to become competent just as any other subscribing witness
with the same duties and obligations to testify as to the will.
By keeping the distinction between an attesting witness and a subscribing witness in mind with regards to an attorney, the problem of the
-privileged communications rule can be understood in its application to
cases of wills. This problem is interesting and vitally important to every
attorney, and he must know just what his jurisdiction holds on the
subject in order to be able to promote the interests of his clients
correctly.
Charles M. Boynton

EDWARD G. RYAN'S GRADUATION ADDRESS, 1873.- On June 16, 1873,
the graduating law students of the University of Wisconsin gathered to
be addressed by Hon. Edward George Ryan, eminent justice of the Wisconsin court. His speech turned out to be something much more valuable
and wise than the usual commencement address. It was not only congratulatory and introductory to the new life being entered by the graduates; it was a brilliant essay on the law and a sagacious instruction in
the best conduct of a lawyer. Its announced purpose was to verify "the
high, arduous and responsible nature of the duties which you are assuming" and to make manifest "our profession as the noblest and loftiest of
purely human callings." In this high purpose Ryan succeeded admirably.
Justice Ryan starts out by giving a theo-philosophical definition of
law in the classical vein:
"Law, in its highest sense, is the will of God. None other has
inherent authority. All else are derivatives of that."
Proceeding on this theme he arrives at a legalistic theory of morality
by which obedience to this law is man's "whole duty on earth," and "the
sole condition of human good." He then finds it necessary to make a distinction between man and the animals and to show that God has given
moral law to man alone.
"Matter obeys its law insensibly. The brutes obey their law instinctively. Man's obedience to His moral law is voluntary. Man
alone knows God, and man alone disobeys His law."
In support of these statements, Ryan sets forth a dualistic
human psychology-brutes are monistic, (sensual alone) ; man
tic (sensual and spiritual, his body and soul being separate
This theory, he states, is a defense against "the monstrous

theory of
is dualisentities).
supersti-
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tion that senseless dust has the power of self-organization into animal
life and animal life the power of self-evolution into rational man." Herein he shows a revulsion to the Darwinian theory that was probably common in the legal profession of the last century-a feeling which continued to the Tennessee monkey trials, when only the black-sheep Clarence
Darrow dared to oppose the great William Jennings Bryan and the best
traditions of the bench and bar.
Ryan then tells how and with what result man has sought to comprehend the divine law and administer it in the society for which he was
created. Society progressed away from patriarchal and despotic forms
of government to governments with distributed powers in which were
recognized the three great functionp of government--executive, legislative, and judicial. These branches attempted to make law which does
not rest on its own right but on the right which it reflects, viz., the law
of God. Ryan admits that man has fallen into much error in interpreting divine law into human law, the causes being lack of intelligence,
failure to throw off his brutish nature (resulting in selfishness), and
consciousness of failure (resulting in restlessness). The general result
has been "a system of experiments, more or less successful, as they have
adhered, with greater or less fidelity, to the fundamental authority of
God's law."
After assuming this very critical view of human law, Ryan turns
to praise the common-law system.
"The unwritten law is perhaps the safest and wisest form of
legislation, . . . the most faithful human copy of the divine law."
He decries the arbitrary changes which were being made in his time,
viz., the abolition of the common law forms of action and the adoption
of code pleading.
Maintaining a censorious attitude, Ryan condemns the municipal
law, seeming to mean by the term not just the law embodied in city
charters and ordinances, but rather the internal written law of a state.
He states that "municipal law, resting in the invention of man and the
expedients of society, is essentially a failure," if you compare the progress which has been made to the progress to be made.
Next Ryan describes the position in society occupied by the legal
profession, sparing no effort to enhance its importance. Society has come
to require a class of men thoroughly trained in the law to counsel their
fellows, because law has become a science, and "the great body of society
has no leisure for its study." The necessity for a bar is arrived at by the
following series of statements:
"In free countries the administration of the law is the law."
"The administration of law implies the judicial function."
"The judicial function implies question and debate; . . . it includes a Bar, trained and schooled in the principles and processes
of the law."
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Ryan says that he has observed from the late Civil War that "no country is free where the bar is not stronger than the army."
Having shown his audience the social position which their chosen
profession occupies, Ryan tells them of the important attributes of the
successful lawyer.
"High integrity of character and life; inherent love of truth
and right; intense sense of obedience, of subordination to law because it is law; deep reverence of all authority, human and divine;
generous sympathy with man, and profound dependence on God."
High intelligence would be desirous, but this is not at our command
as are the above qualities. Reasonable intelligence is really all that is
necessary, for it is high character which counts most.
"Character without high intellect is a greater power for good
than intellect without high character."
Becoming more specific as to the desired qualities in a lawyer, Ryan
instructs his audience in a few basic principles of legal ethics.
"It is the office of a lawyer at the bar to discourage, not encourage, litigation. .

.

. But once he is retained, hesitation should

give way to zeal."
"In the selfish controversies of life, a practicing lawyer should
generally accept all knowledge as uncertain, all aspects of truth
as hypothetical, all opinions doubtful, until tested by the ordeal
of litigation."
No sounder nor more useful advice could be given to a group about to
enter practice than is contained in these statements.
To incite his listeners to the fidelity to the client which is "a shining
glory of the bar," Ryan paints this exaggeratedly heroic picture of the
martyred lawyer still faithful to his client:
"The world may frown, friends fall off, children rebel, wife
desert or betray; but the client has an adherent whose faith never
fails; whose loyalty never wavers; true through good report and
evil report; true to death and to the memory which survives
death."
Ryan admits that the legal profession is not without its undesirable
members, and he describes four different types--"the camp followers of
the bar." The dunces he passes by with light contempt. The pettifogger
is cleverly described and sarcastically reproached. Next comes the infamous shyster--"the Attorney General of crime." Last and most hated
by Ryan is the beneficiary of nepotism---"the professional adventurer
who trades in judicial favoritism."
Returning to the nobler aspects of the profession, he points out with
justifiable pride the very prominent position which lawyers have occupied in the ranks of leaders and statesmen. He even goes so far as to
say "the American aristocracy of brain is substantially the American
Bar."
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In setting forth the way which the graduating students are to follow
and the broad achievements for which they should strive, Ryan makes
two prophesies of things to come. First he observes that the two established political parties are decomposing, and he indicates that the young
men before him will probably take part in the establishment and growth
of new parties which will replace the old. This prediction has not come
true, but it is understandable that he should make it, in light of political
conditions of the Grant administration.
The other prophesy, made with much apprehension, is of the rise of
great industrial trusts which might gain a political power amounting
to sovereignty and which would effect an ascendency of money wealth
over intellect and morality. For a quarter of a century this threat did
grow unchecked, but the legal profession did not fail Ryan. Anti-trust
and taxation laws came into being and were administered by the bar in
a way which prevented the horror of his prophesy from attaining reality.
Bringing his speech to an end, Ryan sends his listeners on their way
into the profession trusting that they are now imbued with the confidence and resolute purpose that in their day at the bar, "order shall be
preserved, law ameliorated, civilization raised, justice truly administered."
No group of students was ever inaugurated into the legal profession
with greater impetus to strive for and maintain the highest ideals that
can be attached to the profession. Throughout the speech Justice Ryan
shows himself to be a conservative, in some places even reactionary.
Some of his philosophy is definitely mid-Victorian and now outmoded.
He is always the idealist, although realistic inferences can easily be
made from much that he says. In spite of these few details in which his
speech seems dated, the reading of it will always be of great value to
the law student, for no more comprehensive nor exalted advice could
possibly be given him. Perhaps the climax of Ryan's speech comes when
he describes the true ambition of the lawyer. These words might well
be adopted as the creed of the beginning lawyer, for by following
their direction he may achieve true success in the profession and at the
same time do his part in maintaining the high honor of the bar.
"To obey God in the service of society; to fulfill His law in the
order of society; to promote His order in the subordination of
society to its own law, adopted under His authority; to minister
to His justice, by the nearest approach to it, under the municipal
law, which human intelligence and conscience can accomplish. To
serve man, by diligent study and true counsel of the municipal
law; to aid in solving the questions and guiding the business of
society, according to the law; to fulfill his allotted part in protecting society and its members against wrong, in enforcing all rights
and redressing all wrongs; and to answer before God and man,
according to the scope of his office and duty for the true and just
administration of the municipal law."
John S. Warren
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RIGHTS OF A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY.-In the early stages of the
development of the doctrine of third party beneficiary rights, courts
believed it to be an anomalous rule and as such attempted to justify it
in the light of already well established principles. It was a much discussed subject and one which has been many times erroneously confused
with the principles of agency, trusts, and novation, and also the law of
property. As an example first let us consider the right of a principle,
whether disclosed or undisclosed, to sue on a contract made by his
agent. Such a case would clearly not involve the question to be discussed
here because the right of a principle to recover is based almost solely
upon the theory that he is a party to the contract.1 Also,.a direction to
an agent to pay money to a third person would not constitute an agreement for the benefit of a third person which might be enforced by him
as such. 2 The doctrine of third party beneficiaries is now, according to
modern principles of law, firmly established and there can no longer be
any reason for giving it a ficticious basis. The doctrine is a rule of law
in its own right and must be so treated.3
According to the English rule from the seventeenth century and on
down to the latter part of the nineteenth, when the decision rendered
in the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson 4 changed the rule, third persons
could recover on contracts made for their benefit. Tweddle v. Atkinson
overruled former decisions and held that third parties could not recover
on contracts made between others for his benefit. In a light of the former
decisions this rule would seem unsound and certainly in conflict with
all previous decisions. Fortunately however, an earlier case, Tomlinson
v. Gill 5 had established the trust theory and has enabled courts since
to entertain actions by beneficiaries on contracts between other persons.
In typical cases in which courts apply it, the trust doctrine is merely
fiction no trust or trustee being mentioned in the contract or even
intended. The true English rule at the present time seems to be stated
best by Fry in Lloyd's v. Harper6:
"Where a contract is made for the benefit and on behalf of a
third person, there is an equity in that third person to sue on the
contract, and the person who has entered into the contract may be
treated as a trustee for the person for whose benefit it has been
entered into."
About the only distinction that can be made between the English
doctrine and the American rule is that in England they proceed on the
theory of a trust while here in America we attain the same results in
a far more direct manner. Contrary to the belief of some writers, however, a person can recover in England the sanme as he may here despite
the fact that the case must be predicated on the theory of a trust.
1 81 A.L.R. 1271 Annotation.
2 Erb v. Baco di Napoli, 243 N. Y. 45, 152 N. E. 460 (1926). Held: depositL of
funds for the payment of bond coupons is not such a promise for the benefit of a third
person as gives the holder of such coupons a right of action against the bank.
3 81 A.L.R. 1285 Annotation.
4 121 English Reprint 762 (1861).
5 27 English Reprint 221 (1756).
6 81 A.L.R. 1272.
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Massachusetts cases have from the earliest time adhered rather
closely to the English rules, but since the arbitrary rule laid down in
Tweddle v. Atkinson 7 paralleled in Massachusetts by Exchange Bank
v. Rice 8 the rule was "modified by a number of arbitrary exceptions
quite free from any underlying principle." One of the most interesting
features to note in studying the Massachusetts rule is the fact that the
earlier cases which permitted the third party to recover, along with the
decision handed down in Lawrence v. Fox,9 had a direct influence in
formulating the prevailing rule in America today.
In Pennsylvania the rule and exceptions are best set forth in the
case of Blymire v. Boistle 10 where the court stated as a rule that where
the contract is for the benefit of the promisee, or in other words where
the third person is a creditor beneficiary, there can be no recovery. And,
in the case of a donee beneficiary, or where the contract is made for the
sole benefit of a third person, there may be recovery only where the
consideration for the promise is a transfer of property or money to the
promisor, or where unusual circumstances are present. There are some
cases which they claim to be exceptions to the rule but they are really
governed by other principles rather than being exceptions.11
Michigan seems very uncertain as to just what rule does prevail and
the courts for some reason seem hesitant to make any decision which
would place it in line with other American jurisdictions. One of the
latest cases, 'People's Saving Bank v. Geistert,12 reaffirms the English
doctrine.
Generally, Georgia is referred to as a state which does not recognize
the right of a third person to enforce a contract made for his benefit.
But, as pointed out in Manger v. National City Bank 13 there are a
number of exceptions to this rule and it would seem from a review of
numerous cases that rights in equity are as broad here as they are in
many of the states which strictly adhere to our general American
doctrine.
Connecticut has been classified as adhering to the minority opinion,
but by the decision in Baurer v. Devenis,14 reaffirmed in Byram Lumber
& Supply Co. v. Page,15 a third person may sue either at law or in
equity on a contract entered into between others for his benefit.
Early Vermont cases maintained that an action could be brought on
contract only by the person from whom the consideration moved and to
whom the promise was made.16 However, quoting the language of the
7
8

Note 4 supra.
107 Mass. 37, 9 Am. tep. 1 (1871).

9 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
10 6 Watts 182-84, 31 Am. Dec. 458 (1837).
11 81 A.L.R. 1275.
12 253 Mich. 694, 235 N.W. 888 (1931).
13 168 Ga. 876. 149 S. E. 213 (1929).
14 99 Conn. 203, 121 Ati. 566 (1923).
15 109 Conn. 256, 146 At. 293 (1929).
16 Pangborn v. Saxton 11 Vt. 790 (1839) ; Hall v. Huntoon 17 Vt. 244' (1845)
Fugure v. Mutual Soc. of St. Joe. 46 Vt. 362 (1874).
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court in the case of Green v. McDonaldi7 it is doubtful that the English
rule is still in effect, the court said:
"In some of the states, the party beneficially interested in a
contract may sue upon it at law in his own name. But, in this
state, as well as in England, an action at law can be maintained
only by the party having the legal interest, that is, the party to
whom the promise is made. The orators, therefore, cannot sue at
law on this contract of assumption, but their only relief is in
equity, where their rights do not arise from the contract assumption, but result from an application of the doctrine of subrogation."
New Hampshire cases formerly denied the right of a third person
to sue on a promise of one party to a contract to pay the debt of another
to a third person in the absence of a novation.18 Butt, in the later cases,
namely Sanders v. Frankfort Marine, Accident Y.P.G. Insurance Co.19
the beneficiary may be granted relief through equity.
Other than these few exceptions which we have just observed the now
recognized affirmative rule in the majority of American jurisdictions is
that a third person may enforce a promise made for his benefit even
though he may be a stranger to the contract and the consideration. This
is the doctrine held in Illinois and Indiana as set out by the court in
regards-Wolf Manufacturing Industries where the court said:
"In Illinois, Indiana an dthe Federal Courts the rule that third
persons for whose benefit the contract is made may bring action
thereon is recognized." 20
Other states also holding the majority doctrine include: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming as well as the
Philippines and Porto Rico.21
From a review and study of the earlier cases we note that there was
much dispute and conflict as to the theory of .permitting third parties to
recover on contracts made for their benefit and as a matter of fact it
seems that there is still some dispute as to just what basis theoretically
the doctrine was made. In the earlier cases we note that recovery was
permitted on the theory of trust relationship 22 while others resorted to
the doctrine of subrogation.23 In Lawrence v Fox 24 the judges based
the right of recovery on the principles of agency but this theory too has

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

75 Vt. 93, 53 AtI. 332 (1902).
7 N. H. 345. 26 Am. Dec. 741 (1834).
72 N. H. 485, 101 Am. St. Rep. 688, 57 At). 655 (1904).
56 F. (2nd) 64 (1932).
81 A.L.R. 1279-82 Annotations.
See annotations 71 Am. St. Rep. 187.
21 A.L.R. 439 Sec. 46 annotation.
Note 9 Supra.
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met with disapproval in later cases.25 Actually, it seems that the doctrine
has prevailed in the United States more on the strength of its reasonableness than upon any general theory of the law. 2 6 In the language of
the court in Gifford v. Corrigan27 later adopted in Peoples Bank v.
Harry L. Winter 28:
.... recovery by the beneficiary in such case is based on the
broad equity of the transaction, rather than on any specific general principle of law."
What is the test for determining a third party beneficiary has often
been stated to depend upon the intention of the contracting parties and
that said intention must have been for the benefit of the third person
in order for him to be able to enforce the contract. This is set out in
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. George Flint 29 :
"Before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional privilege of suing for a breach of agreement to which he is not a
party, he must at least show that it was intended for his direct
benefit."
An incidental benefit which might accrue to a third person by reason
of performance of the contract would not be sufficient to enable him to
maintain an action on the contract 30; the contract must have been
entered into for his benefit or at least such benefit must be the direct
result of performance and so within the contemplation of the parties.31
However, it might be pointed out here that what is meant by the
intention of the parties is not always clear. It is a question of construction and must be determined by the terms of the contract as a whole.
Distinction must also be made between motive, purpose and intent as
the former are quite immaterial. Intention being a question of construction, quite naturally, courts differ in their interpretation, but in construing them the courts may not extend the grounds of liability simply
because the circumstances of the parties would seem to justify a further
demand.32
The real necessity for distinguishing between motive, purpose and
intent becomes quite clear when we consider a case where one of the
parties undertakes to pay the debt or perform an obligation of the
other party to a third person. In this type of case, as pointed out by
Professor Williston 33:
......
it is clear that the purpose usually moving the promises
to exact the provision in question is to relieve himself of a debt or
25 Gifford v. Corrigan 117 N. Y. 257, 6 L.R.A. 610, 22 N.E. 756 (1889). Upheld:
Peoples Bank v. Harry L. Winter 161 Ga. 898, 132 S.E. 422 (1926).
26 81 A.L.R. 184-85.
27 117 N.Y. 257, 6 L.R.A. 610, 15 Am. St. Rep. 508, 22 N.E. 756 (1889).
28 161 Ga. 898, 132 S. E. 422 (1926).
29 275 U. S. 303, 72 L. Ed. 290; see also Constable v. Nat. S.S. Co. 154 U. S. 51,
38 L. E. 903: German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hans Water Supply Co. 226 U. S. 220. 57 L. Ed.
195, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.)

1000.

30 Carson Pirie Scott x Co. v. Parret, 346 I1. 252. 178 N.E. 498.
31

William S. Van Clief & Sons v. N. Y., 252 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1931).

32 81 A.L.R. 1287.
33 Note 29 Suvra 1288.
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duty, rather than confer a benefit upon the third person. But, it
does. not follow that such contracts are not "intended" for the
benefit of the creditor. The question is, has the promisor undertaken to discharge the promisee's obligation to the third party?
Why the promisee required the promisor to make this undertaking
is immaterial."
Accordingly, it is generally held that where two parties enter into
an agreement whereby one promises to pay the others debt to a third
person the latter can recover against the promisor.34 The fact that the
contract would benefit the promisee also, does not preclude the third
person from enforcing the same. Thus, where a grantee agrees to pay
a pre-existing mortgage on the land purchased he becomes personally
liable to the mortgagee for the mortgage debt.35 Likewise, the weight
of authority holds that a partnership creditor can enforce a contract
between other parties, whereby one of them assumes the debts of the
firm upon dissolution.36
Some -courts have attempted to place rigid limitations on this doctrine
so that. there must be some obligation or duty owing from the promisee
to the beneficiary in order to permit the latter to enforce the contract.
Such reasoning would seem unsound and indeed deny the very essence
of the American rule which declares that privity is unnecessary. According to Williston 37
"....

in the case of a promise to pay a debt of the promisee to

the third person, the question, properly stated, is not whether
there is some obligation or duty owing from the former to the
latter, "such as will so connect the third person with the transaction as to be a substitute for any privity with the promisor," but
merely whether the promisor can avail himself of the defenses of
the promisee against the third person."
Twee'ddale v. Tweeddale 38 states the best view:
"An agreement by one person, upon a good consideration, to
pay his debt to another by paying the same to a third person, is
just as binding where there is no consideration for the promise
between the immediate promisee and the third person as where
there is such consideration. Whether the benefit secured to the
third person is a gift, strictly so-called, or one intended when
realized, to discharge some liability of such promisee to the third
person, does not change the situation, it is the exchange of promises between the immediate parties, and the operation of law
thereon, that binds the promisor to the third person." Further:
"The law immediately operates upon the acts of the parties, establishing the essential of privity between the promisor and the third
person requisite to binding contractual relations between them,
resulting in the immediate establishment of a new relation of
debtor and creditor, regardless of the relations of the third person
to the immediate promisee in the transaction."
34 Williston, Contr. Sec. 381 et seq.; 6 R.C.L. 890.

35 21 A.L.R. 439 Annotation.
36 Note 9 L.R.A. (N.S.).
37 Williston, Contr. sec. 368.
38 116 Wis. 517. 61 L.R.A. 509. 96 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 93 N. W. 440.
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If it were so that there must be some consideration between the
promisee and the beneficiary, some duty or obligation owing from the
former to the latter in order for the third party to recover a donee
beneficiary would never be able to recover unless the obligation arising
out of some relationship between the parties would be sufficient.39
After a third party has elected to avail himself of a contract entered
into between others for his benefit, the contract becomes as his own and
it is up to him to bear the burdens as well as reap the benefits.40 His
rights are dependant upon the contract itself and are measured according to its terms.41 If he attempts to enforce the contract he is subject
to all the equities arising out of the contract between the principle
parties and the promisor may set up any defense against him which
he could have set up against the promisee, that is unless it could be
proven that the third person was induced to alter his position by relying
upon the contract made for his benefit. Thus fraud on the part of the
promisee may be asserted by the promisor in an action by the beneficiary.4 2
There are, of course, many more phases to third party beneficiary
contracts than discussed here and unfortunately due to the limited extent
of this article, cannot be covered here. But, briefly summing up the
effect of this doctrine it would seem to be that it creates a legal right
to a third person without creating any legal liability until by some
overt act the intended beneficiary conveys or indicates his acceptance.
When this is done obligations as well as any rights become vested in
him.43 It must be noted, however, that the contracting parties have a
right to rescind the contract any time prior to his acceptance44 and
any attempt to accept after the contract has been rescinded would give
no cause of action or right to recovery.
Norman B. Thirion
THE LAW OF INSURANCE IN RADiO.-If a radio station were to broadcast advertising material received from a foreign, unlicensed insurance
company, would the radio station be acting as an agent for the insurance company and accordingly held liable? Such a situation would be
similar to a newspaper publishing the same insurance advertisement and
one might say thatl "surely an advertisement in the newspapers
cannot be construed as an agency wherein the newspaper is the agent
for the advertiser."
But such is not so simply the fact or necessarily the rule of law
39 81 A.L.R. 1291.
40 Johnson v. Central Trust Co., 159 Ind. 605, 65 N.E. 1028 (1703); Assets Realization Co. v. Cardon, 72 Utah 597, 272 P. 204.
41 Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891).
42 6 R.C.L. 886.
43 See Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa 349, 41 Am. Rep. 103, 9 N.W. 293.
44 53 A.L.R. 178 (Contracts, sec. 5221/), 21 A.L.R. 439 subd. V. (a).
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today. There is a clear-cut division of authority as to whether such a
broadcasting station is liable or not. Some states, such as New York,
have emphatically stated that such a station is clearly not an agent for
the insurance company. In the New York case,2 radio station WOV,
which broadcast from New York, aired some insurance advertising for
the Union Mutual Life Insurance Company of Iowa. The station was
not licensed to practice insurance in the state of New York. The advertising in question was in the form of a recording disc which quoted a
comparison of insurance rates, made reference to sending in for literature at the Iowa office of the company, and requested the age of the'
listener's nearest birthday in order that a sample policy which might
be sent would show the cost of the policy. It was alleged that the
defendant station had violated the following Section 50 of the Insurance Law of New York (New York Insurance Law, 50, as amended in
.1923):
"No person or corporation shall act as agent for a foreign
insurance company or insurers or insurer in the transaction of
any business of insurance within this state or negotiate for or
place a risk for any such corporation or insurer or in any way or
manner aid such corporation or insurer in effecting insurance or
otherwise in this state unless such corporation or insurer shall
have fully complied with the provisions of this chapter."
The court held that the mere placing of the disc so that a comparison of rates could be given or the request- for a person's age, could not
be construed as the procurement of insurance. The station, according to
the court, was not writing policies, settling claims, or soliciting insurance. The New York court, therefore, decided our question in the negative, the grounds being that the defendant station did not aid in bringing "to an issue the placing of the insurance," but rather that its acts
were merely the introductory steps which might have culminated in
obtaining prospects for insurance.
The New York Insurance Law, Section 50, has since been anfended
in 1939 and is now known as Section 112. It reads as follows:
"No person, firm, association or corporation shall in this state
act as agent for any insurer which is not licensed or authorized
to do an insurance business in this state, in the doing of any business of insurance in this state, or in soliciting, negotiating or effectuating any insurance or annuity contract of, or in placing risks
with, any such insurer, or shall in this state in any way or manner aid any such insurer in effecting any insurance or annuity
contract."
This amendment to the New York Insurance Law does not effectuate
any difference in our discussion because of the fact that the statute as
amended does not materially alter the meaning of the prior statute.
The solution as given us by the New York court was not without
strong opposition. Idaho, Kentucky, and West Virginia so expressed
themselves through the opinions of their Attorney Generals. The Attor2 People vs. International Broadcasting Corporation (256 9 Y.S. 349) (1931).
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ney General of Idaho on September 24, 1931, reached just such a contrary conclusion in a case arising under a statute which made it unlawful
"for any person to act within this state as an agent, or otherwise, in
soliciting or receiving applications for insurance of any kind or class
whatever, or in any manner, directly or indirectly, aid in the transaction
of the business of any insurance company,"3 without first procuring a
certificate of authority. Therein the Attorney General of Idaho opinionated that the operator of the defendant broadcasting station acted as an
agent to solicit business for an unlicensed, foreign insurance company.
The New York Penal Law section (1199) which applies is as follows:
"Any person acting for himself or others, who solicits or proIcures, or aids in the solicitation or procurement of policies or
certificates of insurance from, or adjusts losses or in any manner
aids the transaction of any business for any foreign insurance
corporation."
On March 8, 1932,4 the Attorney General advised that a "radio station violated Section 633 of the Kentucky statutes in that it solicited
and received applications for a foreign insurance company without first
having obtained a license to act as an agent of such foreign insurance
company. Likewise, the Attorney General of West Virginia opinionated
on July 28, 1932, that the broadcasting of advertising matter and the
receipt of applications for insurance, if forwarded to a foreign, unlicensed insurance company by a broadcasting station incorporated in
West Virginia, constituted the station as an agent of the unlicensed insurance company.5
Some states have enacted legislation to prevent the broadcasting of
advertising matter for insurance companies not licensed to carry on
business within their respective states. Among these states are Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, Law, 1933), Maryland (Maryland, Laws, 1941),
and California (California, Insurance Code of 1937, Section 703).
We see, therefore, that the decision given us in the New York case6
is by no means unchallenged legal authority. Indeed, the decision appears
erroneous because even though it is clear from the facts that the defendant station was not a solicitor or an agent for the unlicensed insurance company, the New York statutes state unequivocally that it is
unlawful to aid any transaction of an unlicensed insurance company.7
There should be no doubt that the defendant broadcasting station actually did "aid" the foreign insurance company within the meaning of the
New York statutes. This clearly shows the New York case to have been
side-tracked by a theory of agency, rather than by determining the issue
on the material statutes in question.
The state of Maryland recognized the acuteness of our problem and
3 Radio Station KTFI of Twin Falls, Idaho (2 Jour. Radio L. 163).
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3 Air Law Review 455.
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met the issue by passing a model statute in 1941. Maryland thereby led
the way in modern legislation on the matter of a radio station broadcasting material for unlicensed companies. This statute is as follows:
"Publishing or Broadcasting of Advertisements of Unlicensed
Companies, Advertisers, etc., Unlawful. It shall be unlawful for
any person, co-partnership, association, or corporation to publish
or print in any newspaper, magazine, periodical, circular letter,
pamphlet, or in any other manner, or to publish by radio broadcasting in this State, any advertisement or other notice, either
directly or indirectly setting forth the advantages of or soliciting
business for any insurance company, association, society, exchange, advisor or other person, who, or which, has not been
authorized to do business in the State. No person, co-partnership,
association or corporation shall accept for publication or printing
in any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, or for radio
broadcasting, in this State, any advertisement or other notice,
either directly or indirectly setting forth the advantages of or
soliciting business for any insurance company, association, society, partnership, association, or corporation shall hold an unexpired certificate from the Insurance Department, or such radio
broadcasting includes a statement that the broadcasting station
holds such certificate to the effect that the insurance company, association, society, exchange, adviser, or other person, named therein is authorized to do business in this State for the current license
year. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Department without cost to any person applying therefor. Any person,
co-partnership, association or corporation violating any of the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,- and
upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to a fine of not less
than two hundred dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, for
every violation."
Under such statutes the broadcasting station is put on guard. They
must, before they accept a foreign insurance company's advertising,
investigate the company's legal right to conduct insurance business within the average range of the radio station. Thus would absolute liability
be clocked upon the operator of a broadcasting station in a just manner
He is henceforth responsible for such advertising, which, were it not for
his medium, would never instigate the damaging cause.
There is little doubt that more such statutes universally adopted by
other states would clarify the responsibilities of radio operators. It
should be made a part of their business to know from whom they are
accepting advertising material. True, it would undoubtedly call for a
great additional load to be cast upon the radio operators, but the merits
of public policy in obtaining truth and quality in their advertising would
be such as to sustain the need for casting more responsibilities upon the
operators. It is their business to use the airlanes for commercial purposes. To allow them to air illegal advertising and subsequently to
assign them the resulting lucrative profits without requiring them to be
responsible for the proper amount of pre-broadcast investigation might
mean subjecting the listening public to the advertising of a company
which may safely disregard regulations which have been set up by the
citizens in the state from which the broadcast originates. The citizens
of the state have a right to expect the radio operators to protect them
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against such unlicensed enterprises when their station is approached
with such an advertising scheme.
California has long recognized this and has accordingly enacted
proper statutes. The radio station broadcasting the advertisements of a
foreign, unlicensed insurance company was held liable for the violation
of the following statute in the state of California (California, Statutes,
1933):
"Any person, firm, corporation or association in this state,
broadcasting by radio or otherwise, or in any manner advertising
any such insurance company or insurer shall be deemed to have
violated the provisions of this section."
The California Code of 1937, Section 703, has since repealed this
statute. The Code as it now reads is more general in purpose than the
prior statute, but does not substantially change the meaning of the law
in the 1933 statute. The new statute is as follows:
"Acts constituting misdemeanors. Except when performed by
a surplus line broker, the following acts are misdemeanors when
done in this State:
(a) Acting for nonadmitted insurer. Acting as agent for a nonadmitted insurer in the transaction of insurance business in
this State.
(b) Advertising nonadmitted insurer. In any manner advertising
a nonadmitted insurer in this State.
(c) Aiding nonadmitted insurer to transact business. In other
manner aiding a nonadmitted insurer to transact insurance
business in this State. In addition to any penalty provided for
commission of misdemeanors, a person violating any provision of this section shall forfeit to this State the sum of five
hundred dollars, together with one hundred dollars for each
month or fraction thereof during which he continues such
violation. (Enacted 1935)"
Vail Pischce
VESTED REMAINDERS AS CREATED BY WILL.-The determination of a

future interest in a will seems to be one of the most frequent problems
for the courts to interpret because of the frequent litigation of wills
that may have some question of interpretation involved. A good example
of some problems that can develop in the administration of such wills is
found in the following will:
In the name of the benevolent Father of all, I, David Brown,
being of sound mind and disposing memory, hereby make, ordain
and publish this, my last will and testament, hereby revoking all
former wills and codicils by me made:
1. I desire and direct that after my decease all my just debts and
funeral expenses be paid out of my estate.
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Eliza J.
Brown, all of my estate, real and personal, wherever situate to
be hers so long as she shall live.
3. At the death of my beloved wife aforesaid I give, devise and
bequeath all my said estate, real and personal, wherever situate, to my son, William Brown, and my daughter, Clara Brown
Jones, to be equally divided between them, share and share
alike; but should either die before the death of my said wife,
then the share of such deceased child is given to its then living
children if any, share and share alike.

NOTES
The son, William, died before the life tenant, leaving a wife but no
children surviving. The wife of William brings an action to succeed to
her husband's interest on the theory that William's interest in his
father's estate was vested at the death of the testator subject to the life
interest of his mother.
We attack the problem in this case from the viewpoint that the will
is valid and that you may give a life estate in both chattels and realty.
We overlook the possibility of a tenancy in common (in rein) and the
question of substituted beneficiaries, and come to the most vital question
posed by this will: what was the nature of the estate of William Brown
under the will?
In Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities, section 108, a test is set forth
which is as a general rule accepted to determine whether a remainder is
vested or contingent. The test is: "If the conditional element is incorporated into the description of or into the gift to the remainderman,
then the remainder is contingent, but if after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested. Thus on
a devise to A for life, remainder to his children, but if any child dies in
the lifetime of A, his, share to go to those who survive, the share of each
child is vested, subject to be divested by its death. But on a devise to A
for life, remainder to such of his children as survive him, the remainder
is contingent."
In the will under discussion here no conditional element is incorporated into the description or the gift to the remainderman, but only a
clause which would divest William if he died during the life estate leaving children. Thus his death without leaving children does not divest him
of his interest.
The contention of the testator's daughter, Clara, is that it was a
reversionary interest contingent upon William surviving the life tenant.
A reversion is the residue of an estate returning or left in the grantor
from whom all subsequent holders would receive title after the determination of the estate granted out to his wife. Here the result would be
that after the life estate the grantor would have the remainder which
would become subject to his control and whoever takes subsequently
would receive their title as heirs. In this event William would have no
vested estate and after the death of his mother, the holder of the life
estate, the residue would go to the testator's heirs and since William died
before the termination of the life estate he could not take as an heir of
the testator at the conclusion of the life estate and his sister would be
entitled to the entire estate.
William's wife argues that the interest her husband received was a
remainder. Thus we distinguish reyersions from remainders.
A contingent remainder is one limited to take effect either to an
uncertain person or upon an uncertain event. It is limited by the instrument creating it, either to a person not yet ascertained or not in being,
or so as to depend upon an event which may never happen. It is an
estate which is not ready to come into possession at any moment when
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the prior estate may end, as is true in the case of a vested remainder,
where the person who is to succeed to the estate is in being and is ascertained and the event which expressly will terminate the precedent estate
is certain to happen.1 The law favors vesting of estates and unless a
contrary intention is shown the courts will construe a will so as to vest
all the estate.
The distinction of vested and contingent remainders had its origin
in the feudal law by which the freehold could not be vacant or, as it was
termed, in abeyance. There must have been a tenant to fulfill the feudal
duties or returns and against whom the rights of others might be maintained. If the tenancy once became vacant, though but for one instant
the lord was warranted in entering on the lands and the moment the
particular estate ended by the cession of the tenancy all limitations of
that estate were also at an end.2 Today the definition of a remainder
may be said to be an estate limited to take effect after a preceding estate
granted by the grantor ends. The estate in remainder is created at the
same time and in the same conveyance as is the particular estate thus
constituting the whole estate that the testator has to grant and both
pass from him at the time of the creation of the particular estate and
the remainder is said to vest in the remainderman during the continuance of the life estate.3
There are four possibilities if the question before us be determined
to be a remainder: first, is it contingent? Second, is it vested? Third, is
it vested subject to be divested? Fourth, is it vested absolutely?
A contingent remainder is such that the remainderman is not known,
and if he is, his right to possession is conditional upon the happening of
some event which may or may not happen.4 In the case before us the
remainderman is known and there is no condition upon which his remainder is contingent, therefore the interest of William cannot be
classed as a contingent remainder.
The second possibility concerns a vested estate. A vested estate is of
such a nature that it gives to William a present interest which is to
be enjoyed in the future, this future being fixed at the time of the determination of the life estate. Therefore, it can be said that since William
was in being at the time of the death of his father, the testator, he
took an immediate remainder to which he was entitled immediately after
the death of his mother.5

1
2
3
4
death
intent
5

Knight v. Pottgieser, 17 Ill. 368, 52 N. E. 934, (1898).
Blackstone's Commentaries, 169, n.p.
Anderson v. Messinger, 146 Fed. 929 (1906).
Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 Ill. 611, 69 N. E. 804 (1904).
Dickey v. Citizens' State Bank of Fairmount, 98 Ind. App. 58, 180 N. E. 36 (1932).
In this case an estate was given on the contingency that the son be living at the
of the life tenant and "if" he was married and living with his wife. Held that the
of the testator was that the estate should vest only if the conditions were fulfilled.
Chambers v. Chambers, 139 Ind. 111; 38 N. E. 384 (1894).
Yeager v. Farnsworth, 163 Iowa 637 , 145 N. W. 87 (1914).
'Mays v. Burneson, 180 Ill., 396 (1913).

NOTES
Considering the third possibility, we find that where a condition subsequent is attached to the gift to the remainderman a vested estate
subject to be divested is created. In our case the last sentence in paragraph three of the will creates a complication which may be interpreted
to be a remainder in William subject to be divested upon the birth of
children to his wife. If this gift be original, then the children would
take as members of a class to whom the gift is limited; if, however, the
gift to the children of William is substitutional, they take by executory
devise upon the contingency which divests William c-f the remainder.
There is no issue here and this possibility cannot apply.
The fourth possibility is that the estate of William, when he died
without issue prior.to the end of the life estate was contingent upon his
living at the death of his mother, the holder of the life estate, or whether
the estate vested in him was subject to be divested if he died prior to the
death of his mother or the expiration of the previous estate. Clearly in
the case before us there is no clause which could possibly be construed
to do other than to vest in William anything but an absolute vested
remainder in fee.
Examining some of the cases which involve the same question or
problem as we have before us, we find in the Pottgieser case6 the testator left surviving him a widow, three daughters, and a son. The son
married and subsequently died intestate, leaving him surviving Martha,
his widow, his mother and three sisters, but neither child, children or
descendants of a child. Martha, his widow, filed a bill in Chancery on
the theory that her husband was seised of a vested remainder in the
premises and that she inherited her husband's share subject to the life
estate of the testator's wife. The question was whether the son dying in
the lifetime of the testator's widow leaving a widow but no child, would
cause his share in the testator's estate to descend to heirs so that the
widow would inherit, or was it terminated so that the heirs of the testator succeed to it, thereby cutting out the son's widow? The Supreme
Court in this case held that the remainder created vested immediately
on the testator's death in his surviving children, subject to the life
estate of the testator's widow. Also that the interest which vested at the
death of the testator was not divested, as to a devisee dying without
descendants during the continuance of the life estate, since there was
nothing in the will which shows nor tends to limit or qualify the character of the interest to be taken by those entitled to be vested with the
remainder. And if the testator desired or wished the vested remainder
to be subject to be divested by the death of the person seised prior to the
death of the life tenant, such intention, the court said, knowing that the
law favors vested interests, must be found or declared from the words
in the will in such form as to be unmistakably manifesting such an intent. In our case no such intention can be found and the court accordingly gave an interest to the widow of the son.
In the construction of wills in America and England estates are to
6 Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368; 52 N. E. 934 (1898).
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be deemed to vest upon the death of the testator unless very clear words
were found in the will evincing that it was the manifest intention of the
testator that the estate should not vest except upon the happening of a
certain contingency.7 The courts have consistently construed wills
according to this rule.
So strong is the presumption that a testator is presumed to intend to
dispose of his entire estate and not to die intestate as to any part of it
that it has sometimes been said with some extravagance perhaps, that it
will justify almost any construction of a will which will defeat intestacy
as to part of the estate.8
In the case of the will in controversy which we have undertaken to
construe here, we have taken the will and interpreted it as a whole,
gathering from it the intention of the testator with a view of the possibilities expressed by the particular wording in the will and applying the
existing rules of construction and statutes applying thereto and reviewing the cases as to such wording we find that there is no condition subsequent that may subject the remainder to defeasance, no condition
precedent or contingent remainder to defeat the vesting of the gift in
the son of the testator, William Brown. We come to the conclusion upon
distinguishing remainders and reversions and remainders and executory
devises. We find that reversions arise through operation of law while
remainders are created by deeds or devises; that in an executory devise
the estate would not vest upon the testator's death but upon some future
contingency and since none of these possibilities is expressed we may
conclude that the estate that William Brown had was a vested remainder
and being such he had an immediate estate upon the death of his father,
the testator, the enjoyment of which was postponed until the expiration
of the life estate of his mother. Thus it is our contention that the wife
of William Brown will take the fee simple title to the property devised
by David Brown to his son by descent.
Peter F. Nemeth and Saverio J. Alonzi
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CONFLICT BETWEEN TREATIES, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS. -

The

power of the United States to enter into any binding international
agreements is vested exclusively in the national government, however,
no one branch of that government is competent for all such purposes.
For example: Under the Constitution Congress is vested with the power
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations," and to declare war; the
President has power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur, to make treaties;
and the President alone has the power in the control of foreign relations,
as head of the state vested with the "executive power." The state governments, according to article 1 section 10 of the United States Constitution, are prohibited from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation but they may, with the consent of Congress, enter into an
"agreement or compact" with another state or foreign power. Immediately, in attempting to construe these powers the question presents itself
as to what distinction the framers of the Constitution had in mind by
differentiating between a "treaty" and an "agreement or compact" for
is not every treaty really an agreement?
The Constitution itself offers little help in distinguishing these terms
and, if we are to believe some writers the language has no distinction at
all. However, it is inconceivable to believe that at the federal convention,
where words were weighed with the utmost care for weeks and often
months by some of the best legal talent in the states, that these terms
would have been used had they not had some specific meaning. Many
have attempted to explain the phenomenon of these words but of all
attempts Winfield's belief that these words described had the same
intended meaning as the words mentioned in sections 153 and 192 of
Vattel's work, that is: that under the articles of Confederation treaties
of peace, amity and commerce, consular conventions and treaties of
navigation had been entered into and that it was not wise to leave
unchecked the right and opportunity for the states to enter that kind
of a treaty. But, the framers being aware of the boundary disputes that
existed and came about from time to time knew that obviously some
provision had to be made that states might settle these disputes among
themselves and neighboring foreign nations. By using generic terms
rather than enumerating special treaties they avoided the danger of
some treaties arising which would not be provided for.1
Scope and structure of the treaty power in the conduct of foreign
relations seem very vague. Courts as a general rule are called upon only
to pass on the effect and constitutionality of treaties so far as their
municipal effect is concerned and from their language and definitions
it appears that we cannot even give a complete definition as to just what a
treaty is. On some occasions the courts have defined the terms in the light
of existent circumstances; in others it has been compared with contractsi
in private law.2 Courts have recognized an executive agreement as
1 See 3 U. Chi. L. R. 453-64 as to what Framers of Fed. Const. meant by "agreements and compacts."
2 SuUivan v. Kidd, 254 U. S. 433, 41 Sup. Ct. 158, 65 L. ed. 344 (1921).
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having the force of a treaty3 but never have they indicated what test
should apply and, although certain constitutional requirements must be
met, the court has always accepted as treaties whatever our political
departments should designate as such. It is maintained, however, that a
treaty must be proclaimed before it will have the force of the law.
Treaties are practically unlimited as to power the only restriction or
limitation being the Constitution itself. On occasion they have been held
to have a broader scope of authority than Congress itself, for, according
to Missoui v. Holland4 the Court stated that a treaty may serve as a
basis for extending the powers of Congress. No treaty has ever been
declared invalid on the ground that it exceeded its power. In case a conflict should occur between a treaty and an act of Congress the Courts
have consistently held that the one of later date prevails,5 but that the
Constitution, of course, is supreme over both. Treaties, like acts of Congress, are held to be supreme over the laws of the states. With regards
to acts of Congress the Courts have clearly favored the statutes of later
date, but where a treaty is in conflict with a posterior statute it is doubtful whether it will so readily apply. Rather, it will try in so far as
possible to reconcile the two.6
Rarely has the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the state court
where that court upheld a state law which was in conflict with a treaty.
Examples of these exceptions being the cases of Rocca v. Thompson7
and Todok v. Union State Banks.8 This first exception dealt with the
administration of an estate of an Italian subject, domiciled in California,
who died intestate while his wife and heirs were residents and citizens
of Italy. The public administrator of California was entitled to issue
letters of administration upon the estate to Rocca, but the Italian
consul protested upon basis of a treaty between the United States
and Italy of 1878, Rocca claiming that he was entitled to the same privileges conferred on consuls by a treaty between the United States and
Argentina. The question for the court was to interpret the treaty with
Argentina to determine whether their counsel would have administrative
powers in a similar case. The court decided that the administration of
estates was within province of the state laws and that it was not the
purpose of those who signed the treaty with Argentina to take this right
from the states. But, here too, had the language of the treaty been
explicit the court would have probably upheld the treaty. In Todok v.
Union State Bank the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the state
court which had held a state law inapplicable because it conflicted with
a treaty.
The real contribution of the Courts with respect to international
treaties is in construction, yet it is interesting that in interpreting
3 Altnan & Co. v. U. S., 224 U. S. 583, 32 Sup. Ct. 593, 56 L. ed. 894 (191).

4 252 U. S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L. ed. 641
5 The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall, 616, 20 L. ed.
U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. ed. 798 (1884).
6 See 7 Miss. L. J. 402.
7 223 U. S. 317. 32 Sup. CLt.207, 56 L. ed. 453
8 281 U. S. 449, 50 Sup. Ct. 363, 74 L. ed. 956
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treaties the Courts have no general formulated rules or principles.
From a review of decisions, it appears that treaties are to be construed
according to the purpose or intent of the contracting parties.9 If that
intent is not clearly stated on the face of the treaty then the court may
and will consider the surrounding circumstances at the time and examine
any preparatory work and diplomatic correspondence. Applying the "intention rule" does, of course, bring about many difficulties. As an example: often the parties themselves had different intentions according to
the evidence. Naturally, on questions of this sort there can be no uniformity of decisions. Some cases, where the state courts had upheld state
statutes which were in conflict with provisions of a treaty, the United
States Supreme Court has upheld the treaty provisions construing them
with the alleged intentions of the other party thereby making state laws
subordinate to treaties. Such holdings conform to the principle of international good faith on the part of the United States.1O In point is the
case of Shanks v. Dupontll where the court decided in favor of a good
faith policy and against a nationalistic policy. Here, Scott a citizen of
South Carolina died intestate leaving two daughters, one of whom had
married Shanks, an English soldier, and returned with him to England
where she also died. Upon her death her children in her right and under
article 9 of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of
1794 claimed a moiety in their grandfather's estate. The state court said
Mrs. Shanks was a citizen of South Carolina and therefore not entitled
to rights vested in British subjects by the Treaty of Peace and later the
Jay treaty. The Supreme Court reversed this decision deciding that Mrs.
Shanks was a citizen of Britain and entitled to the protection of the
treaty. After deciding her a British subject, Justice Story for the Court
said, "If a treaty admitted of two interpretations, one limited and the
other liberal, why should not the 'liberal exposition' be adopted."
Haunestein v. Lynharnl2 decided nearly fifty years later is a somewhat analogous case. Here, a relative of the deceased who had died intestate in the state of Virginia filed petition to recover the proceeds on
the sale of the decedent's land on the basis of rights guaranteed Swiss
Nationals by a treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation of 1850. The main issue of the case was: within what time could
Swiss Nationals dispose of inherited property? Virginia statutes failed
to prescribe a time limit but stated that the time in the treaty should
govern. However, the treaty specified no time either. Since neither mentioned a time the state court held against the Swiss nationals. On appeal,
this court was reversed Justice Swayne stating that it was a rule that
treaties were to be construed liberally, here the term meaning a broad
construction of the Swiss treaty in favor of the nationals.
9 U. S. v. Arredondo, 8 L. ed. 547 (1832) court said it was guided in its decision
by "the apparent intention manifested in the instrument" See also U. S. v. Texas, 16 Sup.
Ct. 725, 40 L. ed. 867 (1896).
10 See 7 Miss. L. J. 508 for discussion on decisions of the U. S. Sup. Ct. involving
interpretation of treaties.
11 7 I. ed. 666 (1830).
12 100 U. S. 483-86, 25 1. ed. 628 (1879).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
This same question again arose in Neilson v. Johnson13 where Justice
as
Stone held the state law contrary to the treaty and commented: "...
the treaty making power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of the treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflicts
with State legislation and when so ascertained must prevail over inconsistent State enactments."
Still other cases in which state laws were alleged in conflict with
treaties but different from the preceding cases in that the courts did
not declare the state law invalid but attempted to reconcile the law and
the treaty, claiming that no conflict actually existed beween the two
include Rocca v. Thompson,14 Peterson v. Iowa,15 Ohio ex. rel. Clarke v.
Deckelbach16 and Terrace v. Thompson,17 the latter being a most interesting case involving a treaty with Japan. Here the court first arrived
at a conclusion that agriculture was not a "trade" within meaning of
the treaty of commerce and navigation and therefore that unless the
right to own or lease land was given by treaty there could be no conflict
between treaty and a statute. The court in this case examined not only
the circumstances under which the treaty was signed but also the diplomatic correspondence between the two governments. From these cases
it would seem that we may formulate the rule that where a conflict
arises between a state law and a treaty and the statute follows a generally accepted public policy and the provisions of the treaty are not
directly in conflict with the state law the Court will attempt to construe
the treaty so that the rights clearly reserved to the states are not invalidated.
One of the most unique cases on the subject is Todok v. United States
Bank of Harvard, NebraskalS where the Supreme Court reversed a
state court which had upheld treaty provisions that apparently conflicted
with the laws of the state.
of cases show that decision of the court are in accord
-ajority
with a policy of international good faith. Charlton v. Kelly19 and Cook
v. United States20 provide excellent examples of the application of this
policy. On the first the Court held the United States bound on provisions
of a treaty which the other contracting party had not even observed. In
the latter the court recognized, specifically, a treaty as an instrument
which should be interpreted in a manner that would clearly carry out
the intentions of the contracting parties and stated that a treaty will
not be deemed to have been modified or abrogated by a statute of later
date unless the purpose of Congress is clearly expressed.

13 279 U. S. 47, 49 Sup. Ct. 223, 73 L. ed. 607 (1929).
14
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15
16
17
18
19
20

245
274
263
281
229
288

U.
U.
U.
U.
U.
U.

S. 170, 38 Sup. Ct. 95, 62 L. ed. 225 (1917).
S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630, 71 I. ed. 1115 (1927).
S. 197, 224, 44 Sup. Gt. 15, 68 L. ed. 255. (1923).
S. 449-56, 50 Sup. Ct. 363, 74 ".ed. 956 (1930).
S. 447, 57 L. ed. 1274 (1913).
S.102, 53 Sup. Ct. 305, 77 ".ed. 641 (1938).

NOTES
Today a great number of subjects which heretofore would have been
dealt with by treaties are handled by executive agreements, but this
does not mean that the treaty making powers is passing into submission;
each has a fundamental distinction as to effectiveness. Only international issues of which the domestic counterpart is within the range of
Congressional authority can be dealt with satisfactorily by means of
executive agreements. Executive agreements can be domestically validated as long as they deal with subjects within the legislative competence of Congress, for then Congress assures internal enforcement of
the agreement. It must be remembered, however, that this is a federal
state and Congress has but limited authority. Many of the international
problems are on the internal level beyond the competence of Congress to
legislate; these problems can only be dealt with by treaties.21
21 See 35 Ill. L. R. 394.

Norman B. Thirion.
CoRAM NOBIs NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR HABEAS CoRpus. - The usual
manner of reviewing the judgments of the courts of Common Law was
by writ of error, writ of coram nobis and writ of coram vobis. It was a
common law writ, for the purpose of correcting a judgment for errors
of fact in the same court in which the error was rendered.1
In some cases, especially in the United States, the writ is called
coram nobis or coram vobis without discriminating, but the distinction
pointed out at an early date as regards the English practice is that the
writ "is called coram nobis or coram vobis according as the proceedings
are in the kings bench or the common pleas, because the record is stated
to remain before us (the king) if in the former, and before you (the
judges) if in the latter."
The distinction between regular of an ordinary writ of error and a
writ of error coram nobi$ is that the writ of error is brought for a supposed error in the law apparent on the records, and takes the case to a
higher court, where the question or point is to be decided and the judgment, sentence, or decree is to be affirmed or reversed, while the writ
of error coram nobis is brought for an alleged error in fact not appearig on the records, and lies to the same court in order that it may
correct the error, which it is presumed would not have been committed
had the fact in the first instances been brought to the attention of the
court.2
The unvarying test of the right to this writ was mistake or lack of
knowledge of facts inhering in the judgment itself. It was available to
obtain a review of a judgment by the court which entered it where it
appeared that certain mistakes of fact had occurred which had not been
put in issue or passed upon by the court, such as the death of a party,
coverture, infancy, error in process, or mistake of the clerk3 that a
1 Cramer vs. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n. 103 N. E. 459 206 Ill. 516.
2 American Jurisprudence Vol. 3, 1275-1276.
8 Peak vs. Shaster 21 Il. 187.
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judgment against a minor, to whom a guardian has not been appointed, may be set aside in the court where it is rendered, on
motion. Where the judgment has been set aside, the defendant may
make any defense he may be entitled to. The writ could not be employed
to obtain relief from the misfortune of being unable to prosecute an
appeal for the correction of errors of law. Thus, it could not be granted
on the ground that the defendant was prevented from appealing his
case because of his inability to make up a record embodying his exceptions within the time allowed by law.
Where a judgment is suffered by a party under circumstances under
which at common law a writ of error coram nobis would lie, the practice now generally prevailing is to obtain relief by motion to vacate the
judgment, but the statement quite frequently made that the writ is
entirely obsolete is incorrect. It has, however, been abolished by the
provisions of the codes of those states which, departing from the rules
of the common law, have enacted a complete code of procedure, and have
provided for the remedies other than by this writ to accomplish the purpose otherwise sought by it. Under the Illinois Practice act4 which
abolishes the writ of error coram nobis and provides that all errors in
fact which, by the common law, could have been corrected by that writ,
may be corrected by motion, the errors which may be corrected are such
errors in fact as could have been corrected by a writ of coram nobis at
common law 5 and in a later case it was said the only error of fact
correctible under writ of error coram nobis may be corrected under
statute abolishing writ.6
Section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act Provides:
"(Correction of errors of fact in Judicial records). The writ
of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all errors in fact,
committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which,
by the common law, could have been corrected by such writ, may
be corrected by the court in which the error was committed, upon
motion in writing, made at any time within five years after the
rendition of final judgement in the case, upon reasonable notice.
When the person entitled to make such motion shall be an infant,
non compos mentis or under duress, at the time of passing judgement, the time of such disability shall be excluded from the computation of said five years."
The reason why Habeas Corpus cannot be substituted for Coram
Nobis will be brought out in the following summation.
Generally speaking Habeas Corpus is a high prerogative writ of
common law origin, which furnishes an extraordinary remedy to secure
the release, by judicial decree, of persons who are restrained of their
liberty or kept from the control of persons entitled to their custody.
4
5
N. E.
6
7

Illinois Civil Practice Act section 89.
Marabia vs. Mary Thompson Hospital of Chicago for women and children. 140
836 309 Ill. 147.
Harris vs. Chicago House-wrecking Co. 145 N. E. 666 314 Ill. 500.
People vs. Sullivan 171 N. E. 122 339 Ill. 146.

NOTES
It issues as a matter of right, but not as a matter of course. Although
habeas corpus is in the nature of a writ of error which brings up the
body of the prisoner with the cause of commitment, the proceedings is
in no sense appellate for the purpose of reviewing errors, but is collateral and implies a challenge of jurisdiction.
A habeas corpus proceeding has been variously referred to as a
"cause," an "action," or a "suit" involving a plaintiff and a defendant
as does any other action, at least where the judgment is res judicata in
a proceeding upon a subsequent writ involving the same matter, and
where the state, as well as the person seeking to regain his liberty, has
the benefit of a writ of error to obtain a review of the judgment entered
in the proceeding.
The writ of habeas corpus is addressed not to errors committed by a
court within its jurisdiction, as was the writ of coram nobis, but to the
question of whether the proceedings or judgment under which the petitioner is restrained are void. The function of a writ of habeas corpus
in permitting the petitioner to challenge by collateral attack the jurisdiction under which the process or judgment by which he is deprived of
his liberty was issued or rendered cannot be distorted by extending
the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting within their own jurisdiction. While a writ of habeas corpus is in the nature of a writ of
error in so far as it brings into review the legality of the authority by
which the prisoner is confined, it is well settled that such writ will not
be permitted to perform the function of a writ of error on appeal for
the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter. The writ, however, may be employed as a remedy ancillary to
a proceeding in certiorari where necessary to give effect to the supervisory power of the higher court.
As mentioned above, a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error
or a writ in anticipation of error and cannot operate as, be converted
into, or serve as substitute for such writ, even after verdict, to review
non-jurisdictional errors and irregularities leading up to the judgment
under which the petitioner is restrained, such, for example, as irregularities in disregarding established rules governing trial procedure,
irregularities in docket entries, and error in the modification of an
erroneous order, notwithstanding they may be serious, or even errors
and irregularities in the judgment or sentence itself, if they are hot
defects of a jurisdictional character.8
Peter T. Alonzi.

,8

American Jurisprudence, section 29.
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